Thanks @jensei for summarizing the discussion. To build on your points, we wanted to share some data-driven observations from 2025 that strongly support this direction.
We analyzed the Delegate Rewards data from 2025 to understand the correlation between Treasury spend and Governance activity. Through this, we identified a significant misalignment in our current incentive model: the DAO currently pays the highest rate per decision during the months with the least amount of activity.
The data shows an inverse correlation between governance workload and treasury payout.
Evidence 1: The current system creates an imbalance between effort and reward during high-activity vs. low-activity months.
- For May, there were 14 proposals but pay out was only ~126,500 SUMR
- For June, there was only 1 proposal the payout was 152,000 SUMR.
In June, the DAO paid nearly the second-highest monthly total of the year for a single proposal. By contrast for May, one of the busiest governance months, resulted in significantly lower total compensation.
This highlights a structural misalignment: treasury spend does not scale with the amount of governance work being done. Under the current system, quiet months are effectively paid at a premium, while busy months are discounted.
Figure 1: Line Graph comparing “Number of Proposals” vs “Total Payout” showing the June spike
Figure 2: Bar Graph comparing “Number of Proposals” vs “Total Payout” showing the June spike
Evidence 2: The Activity Threshold Challenge
The Activity Boost was originally designed as quantitative incentive to reward delegates who go beyond simple voting and actively contribute to governance discourse. However, the current structure allows delegates to qualify through two distinct paths: forum based (comment volume & topic threads) or 100% participation (voting attendance).
Data suggests that the 100% participation criteria has become the default path for most delegates, effectively bypassing the intended focus on forum contribution. This creates a paradox where reward eligibility actually increases as governance demand decreases:
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In June (1 proposal): With a minimal governance proposal, 100% of eligible delegates (17/17) qualified for the boost. In a low-activity environment, maintaining 100% participation required lower effort.
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In October (6 proposals): Despite an increase in governance activity compared to quiet months, qualification for the boost dropped to ~52% (13/25).
This indicates that the 100% participation path has inadvertently become a substitute for the intended forum contribution. During quiet periods, this quantitative threshold is easily met, allowing the boost to be triggered by attendance alone rather than meaningful contribution. As a result, the current framework incentivizes meeting participation-based metrics rather than rewarding the high-quality discourse it was originally designed to focus on.
Figure 3: Graph for “Eligible for Activity Boost” vs “Total Delegates” across months
Scaling Decentralization and Fixed-Cost Trends
As the DAO matures, the delegate set has expanded significantly, which is a positive indicator of increasing decentralization. However, this growth also establishes a higher fixed-cost baseline for the Treasury each month.
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March: ~118k SUMR (14 Delegates)
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December: ~165k SUMR (23 Delegates)
While expanding the delegate set supports a broader and more decentralized governance base, it also results in a higher baseline expenditure that scales with headcount. The increase from March to December is driven primarily by this growth in the delegate set; as more members join, Base Pay obligations scale linearly, even during cycles where governance activity remains flat.
Figure 4: Line graph showing the “Subtotal (SUMR)” trend line rising from Feb to Dec
Forward Paths for Realignment
To address these observations, we propose exploring two distinct approaches to optimize the incentive structure. These paths aim to balance the need for decentralization with efficient treasury management.
A. Lowering pay to better match workload
B. Raising the bar for delegate activity to qualify for bonuses
Path A: Optimizing Resource Allocation (Dynamic Base Pay)
The Logic: Align treasury expenditure with actual governance throughput to ensure sustainable scaling.
Instead of a static monthly retainer, Base Pay could be structured to scale based on the governance workload of each cycle. We suggest a tiered model that differentiates compensation based on activity levels:
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Low-Activity Tier: A reduced base rate acting as a retainer to ensure delegate availability and context maintenance.
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Standard Activity Tier: The baseline compensation for a typical volume of proposals.
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High-Activity Tier: A baseline rate supplemented by an activity multiplier to reflect expanded workload.
This “responsive” approach allows the Treasury to scale its spend based on the volume of work required. In months like June, payout would naturally adjust to reflect the lower demand, while in high-volume months like May, compensation would increase to reflect the expanded workload.
Path B: Raising the Bar (Quality-Based Boost)
The Logic: If we are paying full price, we demand higher standards. Hence a transition from quantitative participation metrics to qualitative contribution standards.
To return the “Activity Boost” to its original intent, we propose moving away from easily met quantitative thresholds (such as 100% participation or comment volume) and and exploring more robust qualitative filters.
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Potential Mechanic: The use of peer-driven validation models, such as the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) mentioned above or other community-based signaling mechanisms.
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Framework: Rather than rewarding attendance or volume, the system would track engagement and validation from other verified delegates or community members to identify high-signal contributions.
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Intended Outcome: Under this model, the Activity Boost would transition into a signal-based reward. This would allow delegates to qualify based on contributions recognized by the community or peers as high-value, aiming to decouple the incentive from simple participation and re-align it with meaningful governance discourse.
Request for Feedback
We are looking for community sentiment on these two approaches.
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Would a Dynamic Base Pay model provide a fairer and more sustainable approach to treasury management?
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Should the Activity Boost be restructured to prioritize qualitative signals over quantitative participation?
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Are there other approaches the DAO should consider?
Looking forward to hearing from @jensei and the other @Recognized_Delegates.