Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG) Transparency Thread

Strategy & Research Working Groups
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Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG) Transparency Thread

Category Tagline: Dedicated hub for the Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG). Focused on researching, designing, and proposing the Delegate Rewards V2 framework for Lazy Summer DAO.

GM Summer DAO! :sun:

Until now, updates regarding the Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG) have lived in the comments of the framework revision thread. As we move from our exploratory phase into active proposal drafting, we are establishing this dedicated thread to act as our official transparency hub.

The goal of the Working Group is to design and deliver the Delegate Rewards V2 framework by April 2026, establishing a fairer, and more sustainable incentive system for the DAO’s most active contributors.

Moving forward, all updates, meeting notes, and SIP drafts regarding Delegate Rewards V2 will be posted here.

Motivation

Over the last month, the DAO has reached a clear consensus: as Lazy Summer Protocol’s vault strategies and risk frameworks become more complex, our governance incentives must evolve to match.

Recent community calls and workshops (CC #9 through #12) highlighted critical structural misalignments:

  • Treasury Sustainability: Current composition and scale of our treasury require a highly capital-efficient approach to ongoing governance expenses.

  • Workload Imbalance: Fixed retainers grow the treasury burden regardless of actual governance activity.

  • Attendance vs. Contribution: The current system rewards baseline voting but fails to adequately reward high-value, pre-vote forum analysis and risk commentary.

Rather than continuing fragmented debates, the DI-WG will centralize these discussions to explore and design a comprehensive V2 framework. Our mandate is to build a system that protects quorum stability, incentivizes high-quality contributions over mere attendance, and fundamentally aligns delegate rewards with the long-term economic health of the protocol.

Mandate

Create the Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG), empowered to:

  • Define the structural mechanics for Delegate Rewards V2, including minimum participation thresholds, the Dual-Pool incentive system (Voting Pool and Contributions Pool), and tiers for the contributions pool.

  • Model the treasury and tokenomic implications, including establishing a fixed quarterly SUMR budget cap and design the payout parameters (e.g streaming) to align incentives.

  • Identify any required changes to governance tracking and operational processes, such as the implementation of a Peer Recognition Score (PRS) and defining quarterly KPIs.

  • Draft and deliver one or more SIPs that can be implemented or amended by the community to successfully activate the new framework by the start of Q2.

Deliverables

By the end of the 4-week period, the working group will deliver:

Deliverables Description
Framework Design The finalized ruleset for the new Delegate Rewards V2 system.
Economic Model The exact quarterly SUMR budget cap and the model for payouts.
SIP Drafts The final executable governance proposal(s) to officially implement Delegate Rewards V2 by the start of Q2.

Participants

The core contributors currently driving the Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG) are: @Curia(Facilitator), @sixty , @Raphael_Anode , @Jensei

Open Invitation: If you are a delegate or community member interested in actively contributing to the V2 framework design, please reach out via Telegram (@Cccathyyy) or send a direct message to @Curia on the forum to be added to the working group.

Compensation: Should the resulting framework be successfully adopted by the DAO, a proposal may be submitted to retroactively reward the core contributors for their time and strategic design work.

Operating Framework

Coordination Async via dedicated group chat + transparent summary posts in this forum thread. All workshop data will be linked here.

Transparency Weekly public updates + access to all deliverables and drafts

Accountability If deliverables are not progressing on schedule, governance can request reconstitution or termination.

Sunset Clause & Oversight

The active drafting phase of this Working Group automatically concludes once the Delegate Rewards V2 SIP passes a Snapshot vote. Post-implementation, the Working Group will formally disband, and Curia will assume the role of ongoing program oversight. Curia will be responsible for publishing a lightweight quarterly KPI report to the forum to track program effectiveness, quorum stability, and treasury impact.

Next Steps

  1. Collect Feedback: Gather initial community input on this working group charter, the proposed timeline, and the compensation structure.

  2. Finalize the V1 Draft: Over the coming week, the DI-WG will finalize the core mechanics of the proposal.

  3. Publish the SIP: We will post the V1 draft of the Delegate Rewards V2 proposal directly in this thread next week for a formal Request for Comment (RFC).

Momentum is essential to ensuring a seamless transition by Q2. We invite all @Recognized_Delegates and community members to share their initial thoughts on this transparency thread below.

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Lazy Summer Governance Recap [March 2026]
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Thanks for the comprehensive overview on what has been achieved so far Cathy (@Curia). Looking forward to finalizing the new Delegate Incentives framework.

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Miro Board Workshop Update

Over the past two weeks, the Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG) hosted workshops and community calls (CC #11 and #12) to gather data on how to restructure our governance incentives. Below is a synthesized breakdown of the feedback, what we have agreed upon, and what we are tackling next.

1. Workshop Insights & Interpretation

During our first workshop, we asked delegates to answer 8 core questions regarding the vision, scale, and mechanics of the program.

  • Vision & Purpose: Participants uniformly view the delegate role as voluntary or part-time. The primary goals of compensation are to sustain high-quality governance, strengthen decentralization, and align long-term incentives.

  • Compensation Scale & Asset: The consensus is a modest stipend (e.g., ~$300/month tiered, or a pro-rata share of a fixed $3,000 monthly pool). Because the treasury is constrained, stablecoin payouts are off the table; compensation must be in SUMR.

  • Defining “High Value” Work: Voting is just the baseline. True high-value work includes efforts like forum analysis, vetting new protocol yield sources, proposal drafting, risk commentary, thoughtful rationale, cross-working-group collaboration.

The DAO wants a capital-efficient system that rewards high-signal contributions rather than merely paying for attendance or performative forum posting.

Miro Board Link: https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVGB1VQ9M=/

2. Community Call Discussions (CC#11 & CC#12)

In our live sessions, we dove into the structural tensions of the current model and how to operationalize the workshop feedback.

  • The Dual-Pool Structure: @Sixty introduced a structural proposal to separate rewards into two distinct pools:

    • Voting Incentives: Rewards baseline governance stability and protects quorum integrity (weighted by voting power).

    • Forum/ Contribution Incentives: Rewards high-value offchain work using a quality-weighted Peer Recognition Score (PRS).

    This prevents whales from being forced into performative posting and prevents active brainstormers from needing massive voting power.

  • Pre-Vote > Post-Vote: Forum feedback before a vote is more valuable than post-vote rationale, because governance is shaped prior to execution.

  • Streaming SUMR: To balance the flexibility of unlocked SUMR (which causes sudden sell cliffs) and the rigidity of locked SUMR, continuous streaming (e.g., via Superfluid) emerged as the favored middle ground to align month-to-month incentives.

  • Quarterly Budget Cap: Strong support was voiced for establishing a fixed quarterly delegate reward budget to provide predictable treasury exposure.

3. What is Resolved vs. What is for Debate

:white_check_mark: Resolved (Foundational Consensus Reached)

  • Governance compensation is a voluntary/ part-time stipend, not a full-time salary.

  • Compensation will be disbursed via a fixed Quarterly Budget Cap.

  • Payouts must be denominated in SUMR.

  • The system will utilize a Dual-Pool structure to separate baseline voting from high-value contributions.

  • Baseline voting eligibility requires an 80–90% minimum participation rate.

:speech_balloon: For Debate (Open Questions for the Community)

  • How do we calculate the SUMR payout? (Spot price? 7-day TWAP? USD-pegged?)

  • What is the exact percentage split between Pool A (Voting) and Pool B (Contributions)? 50/50? 30/70?

4. What’s Next?

To transition from conceptual consensus to an executable proposal, the DI-WG is now focused entirely on the math and mechanics. Over the next week, we will:

  1. Define the Mechanics & Rubrics: Establish the split for the “Dual-Pool” system, define the baseline voting requirements, and draft the initial parameters for the Peer Recognition Score (PRS).

  2. Model the Economics: Finalize the exact SUMR budget cap, map the Superfluid streaming logic, and determine the pricing mechanism to protect both delegates and the treasury from price volatility.

  3. Establish the KPIs: Finalize the exact tracking metrics that will be used for the quarterly DAO reviews to measure the program’s success.

  4. Draft the SIP: Compile these models into the V1 skeleton of the Delegate Rewards V2 SIP and publish it directly in this thread for an open Request for Comment (RFC).

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DIWG Update: Sync 1 & RFC Publication

Following up on our last update, the DIWG shifted from conceptual alignment to defining the hard math and mechanics. We hosted our first official working group sync (DIWG Sync #1), finalized the draft models, and officially published the V2 Delegate Rewards Framework as an RFC on the forum.

Below is a breakdown of our progress, the mechanics we locked in, and the open questions we are actively discussing.

1. DIWG Sync 1: Locking the Mechanics

During our working group sync, we took the feedback from the Miro workshops and structured it into a cohesive economic model:

  • Budget Cap: Set a strict budget cap of $4,200 per quarter (or $1,400 USD/month) to sustainably reward delegates without depleting the treasury.

  • Pricing Mechanism: SUMR payouts will be calculated at the start of each month using a 7-Day Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP).

  • Dual-Pool Split: Divided the budget into an 85% baseline voting pool to secure quorum, and a 15% contribution pool for high-value forum work.

  • Baseline Eligibility: Required a strict 80% minimum voting participation rate to be eligible for any rewards.

  • PRS Utilization: Restricted the $200 contribution pool exclusively to the top 3 ranked delegates to keep the reward financially impactful and competitive.

  • Success Metrics: Curia will publish a quarterly report tracking Governance Stability, Forum Contributions, Decentralization Growth, Protocol Impact, and Monthly Top Contributors.

Open Questions for Community Discussion:

While the foundational parameters above are locked, there were still a few key items we needed broader delegate input on before finalizing the proposal:

  • Voting Power Threshold: Should we use 60k SUMR (a proportional increase) vs. 500k–1M SUMR (a high-conviction threshold)?

  • 100% Voting Bonus: Should delegates achieving perfect participation receive an extra bonus from Pool B?

  • Pool Split: The DIWG landed on 85/15. Is this the right balance, or would a 70/30 or 60/40 split better elevate contribution quality at the risk of quorum protection?

  • Core Team Eligibility: Should core Labs team members be eligible for Pool B contribution rewards, or should this be strictly reserved for independent delegates to encourage decentralization?

  • Technical Execution & Buffer: Should we prioritize Superfluid streaming (which requires a 10% volatility buffer) or use standard Tally retroactive lump-sums (which saves the treasury the 10% premium but lacks continuous streaming)?

2. RFC Publication & Forum Consensus

We officially published the V2 Framework RFC to gather feedback from the broader delegate community to answer the open questions above.

Check out the proposal here: [RFC] Delegate Rewards Framework V2

Next Steps

  • Gather initial feedback from the RFC thread.

  • Meet with the DIWG to review the community’s responses, revise the RFC, and finalize the PRS parameters.

  • Format the finalized framework into a formal SIP and push it to a Tally vote.

The DIWG believes this framework perfectly balances community feedback with technical and financial reality. Please drop any final questions or concerns below!

Thank you for building alongside us.

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DIWG Update: Sync 2, RFC Feedback, PRS Parameters, Superfluid Partnership

Following the publication of the V2 Delegate Rewards RFC, the DIWG held its second working group sync. The agenda focused on reviewing the community’s RFC feedback, defining the Peer Recognition Score (PRS) parameters, and exploring a potential Superfluid partnership.

1. RFC Consensus

Based on overwhelming delegate support in the forum, the DIWG has officially locked the following parameters for the V2 framework:

  • Voting Threshold: Locked at 1M SUMR.

  • 100% Voting Bonus: Removed. There will be no bonus from Pool B for perfect attendance.

  • Pool Split: Locked at 85/15.

  • Core Team Eligibility: Core team members are officially eligible for Pool B, as they are highly active and possess deep protocol knowledge.

  • Pool B Payout Split: We adopted the tiered distribution model for the top 3 contributors: 50% ($100), 30% ($60), and 20% ($40). We will review the effectiveness of this split after 3-6 months.

Link Here: [RFC] Delegate Rewards Framework V2

2. Peer Recognition Score (PRS) Parameters We spent a significant portion of the sync refining the actual math behind the PRS to ensure it is fair and logical.

  • Role Multipliers: Base weights are applied based on a user’s role. Recognized Delegates = 1.0x, Foundation/ Core Team = 2.0x, Proposal Author = 1.8x, and a proposed “Trusted Contributor” role = 1.5x.

  • Unverified Accounts Adjustment: Originally, unverified accounts had a 0.1x multiplier. Based on feedback noting that 80-90% of forum accounts are unverified, we are exploring raising this to capture valuable community engagement.

  • VP Component: To prevent large token holders from dominating the score just by liking a post, we are using a square root function to compress Voting Power weight. The VP Reference is set at ~7.31M SUMR. This is the mean VP of active voters (those who participated in at least 80% of proposals in the last 90 days). This will be recomputed every quarter.

  • Quality Filters: To qualify for a PRS score, a delegate must comment on at least 3 proposals. Furthermore, an “Author Acknowledgement Bonus” (+2 flat points) is awarded if a proposal’s author replies to your comment, signaling high-value input.

  • Education Initiative: For a deeper understanding of PRS, the WG suggested a possible 5 min explainer to help the community understand the mechanism once the SIP is live.

(Full draft here: [Summer Forum Peer Recognition Score Draft v1] )

3. Execution & Budget Mechanics As we finalize the execution layer, the WG debated how to convert our capped USD budget ($4,200/quarter) into SUMR tokens. Because the token price fluctuates, we must decide how often we calculate the conversion rate and who absorbs the volatility risk (the treasury or the delegates).

We narrowed it down to three potential routes:

  • Route A: Quarterly-Funded Multisig (Dynamic Monthly Pay)

    A multisig is funded quarterly but recalculates the SUMR payout monthly to meet the USD target. It protects delegate pay, but risks DAO budget shortfalls. For example, if SUMR’s price drops 50%, the multisig must pay out twice as many tokens. It could run empty mid-quarter, requiring an emergency DAO vote to refill it.

  • Route B: Fixed Quarterly SUMR (Predictable Treasury Spend)

    The DAO calculates the conversion rate once at the start of the quarter and distributes that fixed amount of SUMR every month. It protects the treasury’s budget, but forces delegates to absorb the price volatility. For example, if the locked rate is 1,400 SUMR per month and the token price crashes, delegates still only receive 1,400 SUMR, dropping their actual pay well below the USD target.

  • Route C: Monthly DAO Votes

    The exact USD-to-SUMR conversion rate is calculated each month and bundled into the standard monthly disbursement vote without using a multisig. It provides financial precision for both the treasury and delegates, but requires continuous governance effort. For example, every single month, the DAO must draft, review, and vote on a new proposal to release the exact amount of SUMR needed for that month’s payout.

4. Superfluid Partnership Exploration Jensei brought up an excellent proposal regarding a deeper partnership with Superfluid.

  • The Decision: The WG supports exploring this. However, to ensure the V2 framework ships on time, we will separate this into its own dedicated initiative to be explored after the current SIP is executed.

Next Steps

  • Update the transparency thread and link all related documents

  • Revise the RFC for final WG review, including the updated PRS parameters.

  • Finalize the exact SUMR conversion rate (7-day vs. 20-day TWAP) and execution route.

  • Format the finalized framework into a formal SIP and push it to a onchain vote.

Thank you to everyone who has participated in the RFC process. We are almost at the finish line!

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