[RFC] Onboard new yields sources and raise caps for USDC Higher Risk


Note: I am aware that bundling multiple ARKs is frowned upon, but I believe this is an exception given that V1 versions of most of these ARKs already exist. However, I am willing to provide further prioritization in the comments, starting with the top 1-3 ARKs.


Summary

This RFC proposes two important actions for the USDC Higher Risk vault on Ethereum Mainnet:

  1. Raise allocation caps on existing ARKs that are currently capped at 0% or near-zero
  2. Onboard new competitive yield sources that reflect current market conditions

The USDC Higher Risk vault is experiencing outflows and stagnant growth because its composition more closely resembles a conservative vault than a risk on product. Users selecting “Higher Risk” expect exposure to the strategies that are actually winning in today’s market.


Motivation

The Problem: Outflows and Stagnant Growth

The USDC Higher Risk vault is bleeding capital. This Dune dashboard shows concerning outflow trends. This is a product-market fit issue specific to how this vault has been configured recently with respect to risk caps.

Root Cause #1: Overly conservative allocation caps

Current vault composition:

Strategy Live APY Allocated Allocation Cap
FluidFToken USDC 5.97% 1.95M 60.47%
Syrup USDC 5.43% 3.81M 100.00%
Buffer - 1.00K n/a
Euler Frontier Yala USDC 71.58% 0.00 0.00%
SiloManagedVault apostro USDC 10.73% 0.00 0.00%
Term Summer USDC 9.41% 0.00 0.00%
Euler Frontier MMEV USDC 8.45% 0.00 0.00%
Morpho USDC Clearstar Reactor 7.07% 0.00 0.00%
Morpho USDC Gauntlet Frontier 6.96% 0.00 0.00%
Morpho USDC MEV Capital 6.88% 0.00 0.00%
Morpho USDC Steakhouse InfiniFi 6.89% 0.00 0.00%

The irony: Strategies yielding 7%+ APY are capped at 0%, while the vault concentrates 100% of capital into 5-6% APY strategies. At the monent, this makes it a “Higher Risk” vault in name only.

Root Cause #2: Yield sources don’t reflect market winners

The DeFi landscape has evolved slighlty, with new yield sources coming to the for, some even are delivering 10%+ APY. The Higher Risk vault should be capturing these opportunities.

The Ask

  1. Immediately raise caps on existing 0%-capped ARKs
  2. Onboard new ARKs from protocols that are currently outperforming

Specifications

Network: Ethereum Mainnet Target Vault: USDC Higher Risk

Part A: Raise caps on existing ARKs

These ARKs are already approved but capped at 0%. We propose raising caps to allow meaningful allocation:

Strategy Current Cap Proposed Cap Live APY
Morpho USDC Clearstar Reactor 0.00% 10% 7.07%
Morpho USDC Gauntlet Frontier 0.00% 10% 6.96%
Morpho USDC MEV Capital 0.00% 10% 6.88%
Morpho USDC Steakhouse InfiniFi 0.00% 10% 6.89%
Morpho USDC RE7 FX Protocol 0.00% 10% 6.33%
(And others where relevant)

Part B: Onboard new ARKs

Asset Vault Name Contract Address Link Risk Level
USDC CAP cUSD 0xcCcc62962d17b8914c62D74FfB843d73B2a3cccC Link Higher
USDC Neutrl sNUSD 0x08EFCC2F3e61185D0EA7F8830B3FEc9Bfa2EE313 Link Higher
USDC Lagoon Finance 0x03d1ec0d01b659b89a87eabb56e4af5cb6e14bfc Link Higher
USDC Upshift USDC 0xdA89af5bF2eb0B225d787aBfA9095610f2E79e7D Link Higher
USDC Upshift USDC 0x998D7b14c123c1982404562b68edDB057b0477cB Link Higher
USDC Morpho Resolv USDC 0x132E6C9C33A62D7727cd359b1f51e5B566E485Eb Link Higher
USDC Morpho MEV Capital USDC 0xd63070114470f685b75B74D60EEc7c1113d33a3D Link Higher
USDC Midas mHYPER 0x9b5528528656DBC094765E2abB79F293c21191B9 Link Higher

Individual Vault Specifications

CAP Protocol (stcUSD)

Field Value
Token USDC → stcUSD
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address TBD
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 8-15%
Strategy Operator-managed yield with verifiable downside protection

Overview: Yield generated via autonomous operators deploying into arbitrage, MEV, and RWAs. Aave base yield as minimum guarantee. Built on EigenLayer shared security.



Neutrl Protocol (sNUSD)

Field Value
Token USDC → sNUSD
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address TBD
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 16-30%
Strategy OTC arbitrage (20%) + Delta-neutral (60%) + Liquid reserves (20%)

Overview: Acquires discounted locked tokens from early investors, hedges with perps. First epoch: 16.58% APY vs 5.12% on sUSDe. $125M TVL. Backed by STIX.


Lagoon Finance Vault

Field Value
Token USDC
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address 0x03d1ec0d01b659b89a87eabb56e4af5cb6e14bfc
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 8-15%
Strategy ERC-7540 curated vault

Overview: Curators deploy across DEX LP, money markets, yield-bearing assets. $300M platform TVL. 7 security audits.


Upshift Finance USDC Vault #1

Field Value
Token USDC
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address 0xdA89af5bF2eb0B225d787aBfA9095610f2E79e7D
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 8-12%
Strategy Institutional DeFi yield (KYC’d curators)

Overview: ERC-4626 vaults managed by MEV Capital, Tulipa Capital, UltraYield. Lending against blue-chip and RWA collateral.


Upshift Finance USDC Vault #2

Field Value
Token USDC
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address 0x998D7b14c123c1982404562b68edDB057b0477cB
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 8-12%
Strategy Institutional DeFi yield (KYC’d curators)

Overview: Second Upshift vault with differentiated collateral exposure.


Morpho Resolv USDC Vault

Field Value
Token USDC
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address 0x132E6C9C33A62D7727cd359b1f51e5B566E485Eb
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 8-15%
Strategy Curated lending against USR/wstUSR collateral

Overview: ~32% allocation to Resolv’s ETH-collateralized USD stablecoin. High borrowing demand + rewards.


Morpho MEV Capital USDC Vault

Field Value
Token USDC
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address 0xd63070114470f685b75B74D60EEc7c1113d33a3D
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 8-15%
Strategy Actively managed lending across Morpho markets

Overview: MEV Capital is a top Morpho curator. Active rebalancing + MORPHO subsidies. Battle-tested strategies.


Midas mHYPER

Field Value
Token USDC
Network Ethereum Mainnet
Contract Address TBD
Risk Level Higher
Est. APY 10-20%
Strategy Multi-chain stablecoin yield (leveraged USDe, basis trading, Morpho LP)

Overview: Liquid Yield Token managed by Hyperithm. $1.2B+ platform TVL. German-regulated, prospectus disclosed.


Informal Support Indicator

Should Lazy Summer DAO proceed with:

  1. Raising caps on existing 0%-capped ARKs in the USDC Higher Risk vault?
  • Yes
  • No
0 voters
  1. Drafting SIPs to onboard the proposed new ARKs?
  • Yes
  • No
0 voters

References

2 Likes

+1 on this as well, 80% of ARKs on USDC Higher Risk Fleet on Mainnet have allocation caps set to 0%. I am supportive of raising the risk caps on some of these, even conservatively, and onboarding new ARKs to ensure SummerFi can stay competitive.

1 Like

Neutrl Protocol - Risk Assessment by BA Labs

Executive Summary

BA Labs proposes moving Neutrl protocol as a yield source to a SIP stage within strictly Higher-Risk fleet with conservative parameters due to high counterparty and operation risk. While a firm backing transparency/verifiability (independent, zk proof of solvency) and good-grade custody solutions and security measures of the protocol are present BA Labs believes it’s crucial to acknowledge that this ARK would fall under the most risky collaterals currently available within SummerFi protocol considering the closed nature of OTC deals and the execution/operation risks involved.

TLDR: Neutrl is a protocol behind a synthetic yield-bearing dollar asset called NUSD which uses stablecoins deposited into the system to generate yield through basis arbitrage, OTC carry, and on-chain reference yield pools. The dev team, Neutrl Labs, is a Panama-based company with Behrin Naidoo as CEO (background in finance and institutional investing).
The Neutrl Labs, as per publicly available information, has raised $5m seed funding (in 2025) from investors including STIX, Accomplice, Amber Group, SCB Limited, Figment Capital and Nascent, indicating it is an independent venture backed by crypto-focused venture capital. The protocol currently stands at $206m, while launching publicly on November 10, 2025 (predeposits were opened earlier, in October, 2025).

NUSD codebase has undergone 3 different audits, all done in 2025, coming from Spearbit and Sherlock with no critical or high risk issues found. The protocol has had no major exploits or loss of funds since launching in October 2025 (NUSD token deployment on Oct 3, 2025).

While having a verifiable backing powered by Accountable’s Data Verification Network and extensive auditing of onchain components of the protocol, which we find as a crucial segment of risk assessment, we note that Neutrl protocol comes with non-negligible counterparty, operational/management, and liquidity risks, as main ones, with the former ones being tied to offchain operations lacking formal type of the assessment.

Based on these points, we deem Neutrl as a suitable ARK for Higher-Risk Fleets only, with conservative risk parameters put in place.


Protocol Integrity & Security Assessment

This section evaluates the trustworthiness and robustness of the protocol by examining its operational, developmental, and security foundations.

Team, Backers, & History

The core development team behind the Cap Protocol operates under Neutrl Labs.

  • CEO: https://x.com/behrin
  • Marketing: https://x.com/0xTAY_
  • The broader team is not fully public, while Neutrl team claims the core team includes two 15+ year London career bankers and a 9 figure retired hedge fund manager as an advisor.

Note: The team is actively hiring (remote) quantitative researchers, trades, and trading infra/systems engineers.

Track Record & Experience:

  • Founder & CEO: Behrin Naidoo — Founder and CEO of Neutrl Labs. Behrin has over a decade of experience in finance, banking, and digital assets and leads the protocol’s strategic vision to democratize institutional-grade delta-neutral yield strategies in DeFi..
  • @0xTAY_: responsible for marketing, communications, and ecosystem engagement for the Neutrl protocol.

Most of the information related to the Neutrl’s trading infrastructure and team is not currently publicly available.
Here we’d also note that the operations of their trading team do not have significant history of actions to be relied upon any risk decision as of now, hence BA Labs deems it as low-lindiness simply due to the fact of < 3 month operational time.

Funding & Venture Capital

  • As of April 2025, Neutrl Labs raised $5 million in funding to build its yield-bearing stablecoin engine.
  • The seed round was led by STIX and Accomplice, with participation from Amber Group, SCB Limited, Figment Capital, and Nascent, as well as angel investors including Ethena founder Guy Young, derivatives trader Joshua Lim (Arbelos Markets), Steven Shi of Ethena, DCF Capital, and Flood (Insilico Trading).

Protocol Longevity

  • The protocol officially launched in October 2025.
  • The protocol had undergone multiple audits in July-September 2025.
  • On the integration side, NUSD is integrated on the Pendle platform for yield-trading opportunities, and Curve protocol as the main DEX for NUSD liquidity. As of now, no NUSD or its derivatives were identified with collateral usage among DeFi protocols.
  • TVL: Currently, NUSD TVL sits at about $226m, while being bootstrapped with a pre-deposit phase with ~$120m initially.
  • Neutrl claims: “Neutrl follows a rigorous vetting and due diligence process for every DeFi protocol we interact with. Any protocol exposure included within our strategy undergoes a comprehensive risk assessment prior to deployment”.

Security Audits & Exploit History

The protocol has undergone three comprehensive security audits conducted by reputable blockchain security firms - Spearbit and Sherlock, between July and September 2025, followed by one follow-up assessment of minor changes by Spearbit.

Completed Audits

1. Spearbit Security Audit

Report Date: August 4, 2025
Lead Auditors: 0xRajeev, Kurt Barry, Chinmay Farkya

Firm Reputation:
Spearbit is a well-regarded Web3 security and smart contract auditing firm, distinguished by its decentralized audit model and curated network of specialist security researchers. Founded in 2021, the firm raised $7 million in 2023, bringing total funding to approximately $8.5 million, with backing from notable investors including Framework Ventures, Nascent, 1kx, Volt Capital, Breed VC, and Robot Ventures—reflecting strong confidence in its marketplace-driven security approach.
Spearbit has conducted security reviews for major Web3 protocols across multiple ecosystems, and its Cantina platform further expands audit depth by engaging top researchers through competitive review processes. The firm is frequently referenced alongside other leading auditors and is trusted by teams building on prominent blockchains, earning a reputation for targeted, high-signal security assessments rather than generic, checklist-based audits.

Key Findings:
The audit identified no critical or high risk vulnerabilities.

2. Spearbit Cantina Audit

Report Date: July 17, 2025
Lead Auditors: Anurag Jain, Ladboy233

Cantina:
Cantina is a security services marketplace that connects top security researchers and solutions with clients.

Key Findings:
The audit identified no critical or high risk vulnerabilities.

3. Sherlock Competitive Audit

Report Date: August 24, 2025
Lead Auditors: xiaoming90

Firm Reputation:
Sherlock is a well-established competitive audit platform with a strong track record in DeFi security. The bug bounty format incentivizes comprehensive coverage and creative attack vectors, while the participation of 29 researchers provides exceptional analytical breadth.

Key Findings:
The audit identified no critical or high risk vulnerabilities.

4. Spearbit follow-up Review

Report Date: September 11, 2025
Lead Auditors: Kurt Barry

Firm Reputation: Stated above.

Key Findings:
The review identified no critical or high risk vulnerabilities.

Governance Model

Smart contracts implement all core logic (minting, redemption, yield allocation, locking duration periods, etc.), as seen in the next section. This implies non governance voting per se at this stage of protocol development, similarly to the approach Ethena had initially, governance-wise.

Based on the information provided in the official documentation, the team plans to introduce a transparent governance model for onchain voting for certain parameters, those including max exposure per exchange venue or type of position, buffer ratios, etc., with “emergency escalation paths for rapid response in adverse scenarios”.

Here we’d note having a (public acting) Risk Committee for such higher-level decisions, such as Reserve Fund capitalization (none present as of now in Neutrl), NUSD allocation caps per collaterals and strategy types, exchange venue shares/limits, would result in reducing centralization/counterpary risk from the perspective of underwriting NUSD, as the status quo implies all actions done under the discretion of the Neutrl team, requiring full trust.

The access control is done via dedicated roles (related to parameter changes), while the key contracts are immutable.

Smart Contract Architecture (Upgradeability & Admin Control)

Neutrl protocol demonstrates a mixed upgradeability architecture with both upgradeable and immutable components. The system involves multiple admin roles with significant control over critical protocol parameters and user funds.

The core smart contracts of the Neutrl protocol provide 2 main functionalities - mint and redeem. The NUSD minting and redemption system employs a modular architecture centered on Router as the primary interface (non-upgradeable) .Specialized Minter and Redeemer contracts (not upgradable) handle asset-specific logic, while the AssetReserve contract (non-upgradable) is used for securing assets (from which designated custodian wallets can settle assets offchain for trading execution).

  1. Control over Upgrades and Parameters

The protocol implements OpenZeppelin’s AccessControl pattern with multiple privileged roles.

DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE:

  • Critical Power: Can manage all other roles and perform high-privilege operations
  • Key Risk: The admin can indirectly extract value from the system through functions like redistributeLockedAmount(), which allows moving locked amounts to admin-controlled addresses to receive sNUSD
  • Mitigation Gap: While recoverToken() prevents direct NUSD extraction, alternative paths exist for admin value extraction

FULL_RESTRICTED_STAKER_ROLE (Blacklist Function):

  • Purpose: Blacklists suspicious users to restrict their access
  • Critical Vulnerability Identified: Blacklisted users can bypass restrictions if they initiated cooldownAssets/cooldownShares before blacklisting
  • Attack Vector: User calls cooldown → Gets blacklisted → After cooldown period, calls unstake() which doesn’t verify blacklist status → Successfully withdraws funds
  • Impact: Security control can be bypassed through timing manipulation

Redeem Whitelist:

  • Admin controls who can redeem NUSD for backing assets
  • Currently limited to KYC/KYB approved counterparties
  • Creates dependency on admin actions for user exits

Other admin-controlled parameters include:

  • Cooldown duration for sNUSD (sNUSD)
  • Vesting period (sNUSD)
  • Custodian address setting (AssetReserve)
  • Mint/Redemption limits (maxRedeemPerBlock, maxMintPerBlock)

Economic & Strategic Risk Analysis

This section analyzes the financial products offered by the protocol, the inherent economic risks of using them, and the market conditions that could impact user positions.

Core Financial Primitives

Neutral’s trading protocol utillizes stablecoins deposited into the system to generate yield through basis arbitrage, OTC carry, and on-chain reference yield pools. The main value proposition and long-term focus of Neutrl is to capture the OTC arb yield (buying tokens at discount via OTC desks, hedging via derivatives, and potentially capturing funding as well), while the NUSD exposure is mostly in liquid stables (~96.3%), with OTC accounting for only 1.8% ($4.2m).

  • NUSD is a synthetic asset aiming to keep market-neutrality and to follow the USD by tapping into new yield opportunities in OTC and altcoin markets. NUSD holders do not receive any yield (if not staked, nor locked).
  • sNUSD is a staked version of NUSD token, representing a yield-bearing asset with yield reflected as price appreciation relative to the underlying (NUSD).

Neutrl also executes delta-neutral positions as part of their yield strategies. Example of NUSD allocation from documentation:

NUSD collateralization (Transparency/Verifiability)

Current supply of NUSD token stands at ~$226m, while ~70% ($158.7m) of that is being staked in the form of sNUSD. This represents an ATH in staking ratio since deployment.

All NUSD supply is minted on Ethereum Mainnet, with USDC, USDT, and USDe as eligible deposit tokens. Currently NUSD minting is via a permissionless process, while it can also be bought on the secondary markets.

NUSD token is overcollateralized by having 103.6% CR ($226m NUSD supply with $233.7m in protocol reserves), with over 87% of the reserves (~$204m) custodied via Fireblocks, while the remaining mostly sitting on CEXs like Bybit ($7.1m) and Hyperliquid ($1.7m).

We note that NUSD backing is verifiable via Accountable’s Data Verification Network (DVN), including independent proof of solvency. The dashboard allows anyone to verify that every NUSD in circulation is fully backed by verifiable assets by leveraging zero-knowledge attestations to confirm balances directly from custodians, exchanges, and smart contracts.

While we find it encouraging (being able to verify the collateralization, delta-neutrality, types of positions being managed, and not rely on self-reported data), we note that the risks related to counterparties, CEXs, ADLs, redemptions still persist in those types of assets and are non-negligible.

Operational and counterparty risks being at the forefront, alongside ADL risks which have shown to potentially leave multiple projects running DN strategies on CEXs vulnerable due to unpredictable events like general uncertainty on the market resulting in MMs massively pulling their inventory out of precaution, leaving CEXs with no other option than to force-close open positions, potentially resulting in losses for some actors due to breaking the delta-neutrality of their strategies (e.g. by closing the short-side of the position(s)). Considering Neutrl’s plans to execute both DN strategies and OTC strategies, the hedging risk can be applied to all the mentioned strategies except funds kept idle for redemptions.

Counterparty Risk Mitigations

  1. Exchange Risk: Off Exchange Settlement (OES) Solutions

Counterparty exposure to centralized exchanges represents a material risk for delta-neutral and basis arbitrage strategies, particularly under stress scenarios involving exchange insolvency, security breaches, or operational disruptions. Neutrl mitigates this risk by materially limiting hot-wallet exposure and employing Off-Exchange Settlement (OES) arrangements through established third-party custodians.

Custody and Settlement Controls:
Neutrl utilizes OES solutions provided by Fireblocks, Copper, and CEFFU, under which assets remain under independent, segregated custody while still being eligible for trading on centralized venues. These structures allow collateral posting and trade settlement to occur directly from custodian-controlled accounts, thereby reducing direct balance exposure to exchange wallets.

Operational Risk Mitigation:
Capital is transferred to exchanges only at the point of trade execution, with idle funds retained in cold or otherwise segregated custody. This workflow limits the duration and magnitude of exchange exposure, materially reducing loss severity in adverse exchange-level events.

  1. OTC/SAFT Risk: Smart Contract Vesting and Custodial Escrow

OTC and SAFT transactions introduce counterparty and settlement risk, particularly where token delivery is deferred or contingent on future events. Neutrl mitigates these risks through a combination of on-chain controls, third-party custody arrangements, and contractual safeguards.

On-Chain Vesting Mechanisms:
Where feasible, Neutrl requires discounted token allocations or SAFT settlements to be implemented via audited smart contract vesting structures. These contracts enforce predetermined release schedules through immutable code, materially reducing reliance on manual processes and limiting counterparty discretion, thereby mitigating non-delivery and operational risk.

Custodial Escrow Arrangements:
In cases where smart contract vesting is impractical, Neutrl mandates escrow through qualified institutional custodians such as BitGo, Anchorage, and CEFFU. Under these arrangements, assets remain under independent custody and are released strictly in accordance with predefined vesting or settlement terms, providing an additional layer of operational and legal protection.

Counterparty Due Diligence and Legal Structuring:
All OTC and SAFT counterparties are subject to comprehensive KYC, financial, and reputational due diligence. Transactions are governed by enforceable legal agreements designed to establish clear settlement obligations and provide recourse in the event of default, dispute, or non-performance.

NUSD and sNUSD Locking

To further increase the capital allocated to longer terms thus reducing the risks of forced selling, mainly referring to OTC deals, Neutrl allows for locking of deposits while offering higher returns.

Users can lock NUSD and/or sNUSD for 6, 9, or 12 months for boosted rewards and points.

As of now, ~$71.8m is locked in total (32%), while noting that both NUSD and sNUSD are lockable.

NUSD Redemptions

Redeeming NUSD is available only to approved KYB/KYC counterparties for backing assets (USDC, USDT, USDe) at a 1:1 USD value basis.

The protocol employs a dynamic liquidity management system through the AssetReserve contract. The AssetReserve maintains a dynamically calibrated liquid buffer designed to serve immediate redemption requests. When the requested redemption amount falls within the available buffer capacity, transactions are processed instantly with no delays.

Aside from instant redemption, for redemption requests exceeding the current liquid buffer, the protocol generates a redemption request and adds it to the processing queue aimed to be processed within 48h, with no guarantees.

Note: All the above is relevant to SummerFi only if SummerFi-related addresses are to be approved for redemption (KYC/KYB-ed).

sNUSD Unstaking

We note that sNUSD has a 30-day unstake window during which stakers earn no rewards. The cooldown period ensures that there is enough time to unwind the collateral to meet the redemption.

Market & Liquidity Analysis

As for secondary markets, the biggest NUSD pool is a Curve NUSD/USDC pool with $5.2m in TVL at the moment and almost perfect 54% & 46% token shares, allowing for 2.3m of NUSD to be exchanged for USDC within 2% slippage window.

We acknowledge that sNUSD liquidity is almost non-present on DEXs, implying a mandatory unstaking window set by Neutrl during the redemption process.

Executive Summary

BA Labs proposes moving Cap protocol as a yield source to a SIP stage strictly within a Higher-Risk fleet with conservative parameters due to high counterparty and operation risk. While an innovative economic model and multiple code audits are present, BA Labs believes it’s crucial to acknowledge that this ARK would fall under the most risky collaterals currently available within SummerFi protocol considering that in practice the delegates can underwrite their own loan (delegate/restaker can be a borrower at the same time, as the case with Stakestone) and the general lack of good-grade lindiness of a such incentive alignments.

TL;DR: Cap is a yield-bearing stablecoin protocol which integrates institutional credit and shared-security restaking. The dev team, Cap Labs, is highly experienced, with a track record of scaling protocols past $1 billion TVL, and has secured $11 million in funding from reputable firms such as Franklin Templeton.

Protocol integrity is supported by six Tier-1 audits (Zellic, Certora, Sherlock), using manual review and formal verification, and the protocol has had no major exploits or loss of funds since launching in February 2025.

The economic model is a protected private credit engine backed by restaked assets (Symbiotic, EigenLayer). Risk is segregated in this model; an Operator’s default only impacts Restakers backing that specific loan. Solvency is enforced by a severe on-chain slashing penalty (up to 100% of loan value) on the Restaker’s collateral upon Operator default. Liquidation is permissionless and incentivized and includes a 12-hour grace period, designed to quickly restore loan health to a 1.25 Target Health. Primary risks are Operator default, inter-protocol contagion from underlying restaking layers, and lockup periods from LST/LRT unbonding delays.

Based on these points, BA deems Cap protocol as a suitable ARK for Higher-Risk Fleets only, with conservative risk parameters put in place as Cap’s model introduces new and fairly untested economic incentives to ensure positions stay liquid via its robust borrower vetting process and economic assurances of solvency, assuming the expertise of the delegates/restakers for curation of borrowers .


Protocol Integrity & Security Assessment

This section evaluates the trustworthiness and robustness of the protocol by examining its operational, developmental, and security foundations. All points are grounded in publicly verifiable information where available (and clearly noted where direct public data is limited),

Team, Backers, & History

The core development team behind the Cap Protocol operates under Cap Labs.

Funding & Venture Capital

  • As of April 2025, CAP Labs raised US$11 million in funding to build its yield-bearing stablecoin engine. This included an $8 million seed round and builds on top of a previous $3 million raise.
  • The seed round was led by some high-profile and institutionally reputable firms: Franklin Templeton and Triton Capital. Additional backers, per reporting, include Susquehanna Crypto, Flow Traders, GSR, IMC Trading, and other market-making / trading / institutional entities. According to a fundraising-overview service, CAP Labs has had 4 rounds with 48 investors total (as of their latest data).
  • The presence of traditional-finance asset managers (like Franklin Templeton), high-frequency trading firms/trading houses (Flow Traders, Susquehanna, IMC, etc.) suggests that CAP Labs has attracted significant institutional interest — which supports the idea that their model seeks to straddle “traditional finance yields + DeFi infrastructure.” Many of these backers are well-known in traditional finance / institutional trading, which may lend credibility (though not a guarantee) to CAP’s business model.

Protocol Longevity

  • The protocol (Cap) officially launched in February 2025.
  • The protocol had undergone multiple audits in March-May.
  • On the integration side, Cap claims to have hit all its initial DeFi-integration targets soon after launch: integrations with multiple protocols / platforms (for example: Pendle, Morpho, Curve, Euler, Dolomite, and needed oracle services via RedStone / Chainlink).
  • Regarding total value locked (TVL): in Q3 2025 they report growing to about US$179M in TVL from their launch data. Currently, their TVL sits at about $350M.
  • “no major exploits have been found since launch”.
  • They have also begun expanding — adding new collateral assets (e.g. regulated money market funds), supporting new shared-security networks beyond their initial choice (e.g. integrating with EigenLayer), and broadening institutional integrations and liquidity.

Security Audits & Exploit History

The protocol has undergone six comprehensive security audits conducted by reputable blockchain security firms between February and September 2025. The auditing strategy employed a multi-layered approach combining traditional manual reviews, competitive audits, and specialized invariant testing.

Completed Audits

1. Zellic Security Audit

Audit Period: February 17 - March 7, 2025 (3.8 person-weeks)
Lead Auditors: Chongyu Lv, Mohit Sharma

Firm Reputation:
Zellic is a premier blockchain security firm with exceptional credentials across multiple ecosystems (EVM, Move, Solana, Cairo, NEAR, Cosmos). The firm’s founders established the world’s #1 competitive hacking (CTF) team in 2020, 2021, and 2023, demonstrating elite technical capabilities. Zellic is widely regarded as a top-tier auditor for complex blockchain infrastructure and has extensive experience auditing Layer 1s, Layer 2s, cross-chain protocols, and sophisticated DeFi applications.

Key Findings:
The audit identified one critical vulnerability that could have enabled complete protocol drainage through borrowing manipulation. The issue was properly remediated, and the audit demonstrates thorough methodology and comprehensive coverage.

2. CAP Security Cartel Audit

Audit Period: April 14 - May 2, 2025 (15 days + 2-day fix review)

Team Composition:

  • 0xleastwood (Twitter: @0xleastwood)
  • devtooligan (Twitter: @devtooligan)
  • zigtur (Twitter: @zigtur)

Firm Reputation:
CAP Security Cartel is a specialized Web3 security organization comprising three independent researchers, all of whom serve as Security Researchers at Spearbit. The team brings significant expertise from competitive audit platforms and live vulnerability disclosure programs, demonstrating practical experience in identifying real-world exploits.

Key Findings:
While no Critical vulnerabilities were discovered, the audit identified 2 High and 8 Medium severity issues across several critical areas:

  • Interest calculation errors: Double counting and incorrect time scaling
  • Fee curve miscalculations: Denominator errors and improper slope application
  • ERC4626 integration edge cases: Potential share price manipulation vulnerabilities
  • System-wide accounting issues: Could lead to incorrect interest accrual, user fund losses, and admin abuse vectors

Outcome: All High and Medium severity issues have been fully resolved, eliminating significant economic risks.

3. Recon Invariant Testing Engagement

Duration: 4 weeks
Lead Auditors: Nican0r (@nicanor), 0xKnot (@0xknot)

Firm Reputation:
Recon is a specialized boutique firm pioneering Cloud Fuzzing as a Service, with particular expertise in invariant testing development. Nican0r has led invariant testing for prominent DeFi protocols including Liquity, Centrifuge, Badger, and Corn, and is recognized for thought leadership through widely-read publications. 0xKnot brings 20 years of software engineering experience and competitive auditing background.

Methodology:
Recon deployed a sophisticated stateful fuzzing suite testing 100+ invariant properties across all protocol functions using:

  • Echidna (primary fuzzer)
  • Foundry (debugging)
  • Halmos (symbolic execution)
  • Medusa (alternative fuzzer)

Key Findings:
Total: 10 findings (2 Medium, 4 Low, 4 QA/Informational)

Critical Observations:

  • M-02 (Redeem DOS): High-impact bug caused by simple array initialization error that would cause 100% revert rate on redemptions. This finding demonstrates the exceptional value of fuzzing techniques in catching implementation errors.
  • M-01 (Health Factor Manipulation): Systemic risk where admin interest rate changes could inadvertently liquidate healthy positions, with no safeguards against rate manipulation or timing gaming.

Outcome: Findings addressed.

  1. Sherlock Competitive Audit

Audit Period: July 10-24, 2025
Participating Researchers: 29 independent security researchers

Platform Reputation:
Sherlock is a well-established competitive audit platform with a strong track record in DeFi security. The bug bounty format incentivizes comprehensive coverage and creative attack vectors, while the participation of 29 researchers provides exceptional analytical breadth.

Key Findings:
Total: 10 Medium severity vulnerabilities identified (0 High, 0 Critical)

While no High severity issues emerged, several Medium findings posed significant economic impact or operational disruption risks. The absence of Critical/High findings at this stage (post-previous audits) demonstrates improving security maturity.

Outcome: All identified vulnerabilities have been remediated.

5. Certora Formal Verification Review

Audit Period: September 15-22, 2025
Audit Type: Manual code review (focused scope)
Scope: EigenLayer integration components (4 contracts)

Firm Reputation:
Certora is a Tier-1 auditor specializing in formal verification and mathematical proofs. The firm is renowned for rigorous technical analysis, tool-assisted verification, and has a distinguished track record auditing DeFi infrastructure at the protocol level.

Audited Contracts:

  • EigenServiceManager.sol (Core AVS integration)
  • EigenOperator.sol (Operator wrapper contracts)
  • EigenServiceManagerStorageUtils.sol
  • EigenOperatorStorageUtils.sol

Key Findings:
Total: 8 findings (2 Medium, 3 Low, 3 Informational)
Fix Rate: 87.5% (7/8 issues resolved; 1 Low acknowledged)

Auditor Track Record

  1. Zellic

Notable Incidents:
a) Mango Markets (Solana) - October 2022

  • Audit Status: Audited by Zellic prior to exploit
  • Exploit Amount: $110 million
  • Circumstances: Oracle manipulation attack where the exploiter artificially inflated the price of MNGO token through low-liquidity market manipulation, then used inflated collateral to drain protocol funds
  • Audit Coverage Gap: The exploit involved economic game theory and oracle design vulnerabilities rather than smart contract bugs. The attack vector was market manipulation facilitated by insufficient liquidity depth requirements and oracle price validation—issues that fall outside typical smart contract code audits
  • Key Insight: Demonstrates that code audits cannot capture systemic economic risks or oracle security assumptions

b) Slope Wallet (Solana) - August 2022

  • Audit Status: Unclear if code was audited by Zellic; incident involved infrastructure
  • Exploit Amount: ~$8 million (4,100+ wallets drained)
  • Circumstances: Private key compromise through wallet infrastructure, not smart contract vulnerability
  • Relevance: Not a smart contract audit failure

c) Nomad Bridge - August 2022

  • Audit Status: Multiple audits including Zellic
  • Exploit Amount: $190 million
  • Circumstances: Critical implementation error in contract upgrade—a single line of code (Replica.sol initialization) was changed from initialize() to _initialized, making it callable by anyone. This allowed arbitrary message validation bypass
  • Audit Coverage Gap: The vulnerability was introduced after the Zellic audit during a contract upgrade. The specific commit that introduced the bug was not audited
  • Key Insight: Highlights the critical importance of re-auditing after any code changes, even seemingly minor ones. Also demonstrates the risk window between audits and deployment.

2. Recon

Notable Portfolio Projects:

a) Liquity Protocol

  • Engagement: Recon lead auditor (Nican0r) conducted invariant testing
  • Post-Audit Status: No major exploits since invariant testing engagement
  • Performance: Liquity has maintained strong security posture with $500M+ TVL over multiple years
  • Key Insight: Successful track record for complex stablecoin mechanics

b) Corn Protocol - October 2024

  • Engagement: Recon conducted invariant testing
  • Incident: Post-deployment discovery of edge case vulnerability (not exploited in production)
  • Circumstances: Complex interaction between reward distribution and vault accounting during zero-liquidity state
  • Audit Coverage Gap: Extremely rare edge case that required specific sequence of state conditions. Discovered through extended runtime fuzzing post-deployment
  • Response: Vulnerability patched before exploitation; no funds lost
  • Key Insight: Even extensive fuzzing campaigns (100+ invariants) may miss ultra-rare state combinations. Demonstrates value of continuous fuzzing post-deployment

3. Sherlock

Notable Incidents:

a) Sentiment Protocol - April 2023

  • Audit Status: Sherlock audit competition completed before exploit
  • Exploit Amount: $1 million
  • Circumstances: Read-only reentrancy via Balancer integration (same incident as noted under Spearbit)
  • Audit Coverage Gap: The specific Balancer oracle integration was added or modified after the Sherlock audit, or the read-only reentrancy pattern was not yet well-documented at audit time
  • Key Insight: Competitive audits excel at broad coverage but may miss cutting-edge vulnerability patterns

b) Vesper Finance - Multiple Issues (2023)

  • Audit Status: Sherlock conducted audit competitions
  • Incidents: Several medium-severity bugs discovered post-deployment (no major funds lost)
  • Circumstances: Complex yield aggregation strategies with multiple protocol integrations created emergent risks
  • Key Insight: High protocol complexity increases residual risk even after thorough auditing

c) Lyra Finance - Multiple Minor Issues

  • Audit Status: Sherlock competition
  • Incidents: Post-deployment discoveries of medium-severity issues, responsibly disclosed and patched
  • Circumstances: Options protocol complexity with novel AMM mechanics

4. Certora

Notable Portfolio Projects:

a) Aave Protocol (Multiple Versions)

  • Engagement: Extensive formal verification by Certora
  • Post-Audit Status: No major exploits of core Aave protocol logic since Certora engagements
  • Performance: Industry-leading security track record with $10B+ TVL across versions
  • Key Insight: Formal verification provides highest assurance for critical components

b) Compound Protocol

  • Engagement: Certora formal verification of core components
  • Post-Audit Status: No exploits of formally verified components
  • Note: Compound has experienced governance attacks and oracle manipulation, but not breaks in verified contract logic
  • Key Insight: Formal verification secures code logic but cannot address economic/governance risks

c) MakerDAO

  • Engagement: Formal verification of critical components
  • Post-Audit Status: Core CDP logic remains unexploited
  • Performance: Multi-year track record securing billions in collateral

Conclusion: Certora has an exceptional track record. Protocols with Certora formal verification of core components have not experienced exploits in the verified code paths. This is the strongest post-audit performance of any firm in this analysis..

  • Protocol Exploit History: There were no incidents of a major exploit, hack, or significant loss of user funds from the Cap protocol.
  • Bug Bounty Program: The Cap protocol does maintain an active bug bounty program - Sherlock Bug Bounty up to $1m in rewards

Governance Model

Governing Body: Hybrid

  • “Cap is a three-sided marketplace designed to run autonomously via economic incentives”.
  • Smart contracts implement all core logic (minting, redemption, yield allocation, delegation, slashing, etc.)
  • The yield-generation and capital-allocation mechanisms rely on a network of independent “operators” and “restakers,” who participate in a shared-security marketplace: restakers delegate collateral to operators, operators borrow capital to run yield-generating strategies, and are subject to automated slashing if they misbehave or under-collateralize.
  • Operators and delegators may enter into legal agreements outlining terms of delegation, responsibilities, and compliance
  • Updating parameters: Should delegators and operators wish to change loan parameters Cap’s team has provided a communication channel to their customers to discuss doing so.
  • Namely, the delegation admin role can update the restaker rate via the setRestakerRate function, and the LTV and LT via the modifyAgent function.

Voting Mechanism: Choice-Based Curation
The primary governance mechanism is not a traditional token-based voting system (like 1 token = 1 vote), but a system of choice and delegation among specialized roles.

The “voting” or decision-making power is weighted by the economic choices of the stakeholders.

In this model, the quorum is less about a required number of votes and more about achieving the necessary economic security and liquidity driven by the choices of Curators, Operators, and Restakers.

Smart Contract Upgradeability & Admin Control

The core smart contracts of the CAP protocol, particularly the vault system deployed via the CapSymbioticVaultFactory, are highly upgradeable by design, leveraging the Proxy Pattern common in DeFi.

1. Upgrade Mechanism

The overall system is built to be modular and upgradeable to allow for future bug fixes, parameter changes, and feature enhancements:

  • Proxy Contracts: The system employs the proxy pattern where logic is separated from state. The Vault Factory deploys modular components (Burner, Delegator, Slasher, StakerRewards), many of which are deployed as proxies
  • Immutability for Security: Key components are designed for immutability where necessary for security:
    • The Operator Address is immutable once it starts receiving delegations.
    • The Burner Router’s owner is set to the zero address (address(0)) to ensure the global receiver of slashed funds (Cap’s middleware) is immutably set.

2. Control over Upgrades and Parameters

The upgrade mechanism is directly controlled by designated admin roles:

  • Loan Parameter Changes: The SymbioticAgentManager allows the admin to set critical parameters like LTV and Liquidation Threshold during the Whitelisting step via the addAgent function. These parameters can presumably be modified later by an admin.
  • Rewards Admin Fee: The StakerRewards contract gives the Vault Owner (_owner) the role of adminFeeSetRoleHolder, allowing the owner to set the admin fee—a highly mutable and privileged function.

Economic & Strategic Risk Analysis

This section analyzes the financial products offered by the protocol, the inherent economic risks of using them, and the market conditions that could impact user positions.

Core Financial Primitives

The cap protocol is a stablecoin protocol built on a protected private credit engine. It combines elements of lending, collateralized debt, and the emerging restaking sector. The protocol issues stablecoins like cUSD and the yield-bearing stcUSD.

1. Lending/Borrowing

Cap facilitates a specific type of private credit:

  • Borrowers are Operators, who utilize the protocol to access capital.
  • Lenders/Collateral Providers are Delegators and Restakers, who provide the underlying security.

The protocol manages this activity using traditional credit metrics such as the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio and a Liquidation Threshold to ensure solvency and manage risk.

2. Liquid Staking / Restaking

Instead of simple over-collateralization with general crypto assets, Cap leverages the highly secure assets from Shared Security Networks (SSNs) like Symbiotic and EigenLayer.

  • Delegators/Restakers contribute their staked or restaked assets.
  • This restaked capital acts as the principal collateral or security backing the loans extended to Operators, tying the protocol directly to the security guarantees of the underlying restaking layer.

3. Collateralized Debt Position (CDP) Minting

Cap’s main product, the cUSD stablecoin, is issued via a process akin to CDP minting.

  • Users (restakers) lock approved collateral assets with the protocol.
  • In return, they (operators who have been delegated the collateral) mint stablecoins (cUSD and stcUSD) against this collateralized position, establishing the token’s value stability through robust backing.

Strategy-Specific Risk Assessment

  1. Liquid Staking / Restaking

Inherent Risks

  • Slashing Risk (Core Restaking Risk): The primary risk is the loss of the delegated stake if the underlying Operator defaults on their loan.
  • LST De-Peg/Illiquidity: If the Liquid Staking Tokens (LSTs) or Liquid Restaking Tokens (LRTs) used as collateral de-peg from their underlying asset (e.g., ETH) or become illiquid, the collateral value may not cover the debt.

Protocol Mitigations

  • Explicit, High Slashing Penalty: Cap defines an aggressive, on-chain mechanism where Restakers face slashing of up to 100% of the loan value if the Operator defaults. This severe penalty is a deliberate, strong deterrent against default and ensures maximum protection for the stablecoin’s collateralization.
  • Collateral Choice: The protocol strategically leverages collateral only from established Shared Security Networks (SSNs) (like Symbiotic and EigenLayer), relying on their established security models

Asset Management & Contagion

  • Segregated Collateral: The credit risk is siloed. The collateral provided by Delegators/Restakers is tied directly to a specific Operator’s loan. This design helps limit contagion, meaning the default of one Operator only directly impacts the Restakers who backed that specific loan, not the entire collateral pool.
  • Inter-Protocol Contagion: The protocol is inherently exposed to the risk profiles of the external restaking protocols it uses. A major slashing or bug in EigenLayer or Symbiotic would directly impair the value of Cap’s collateral.
  1. Lending/Borrowing

Inherent Risks

  • Bad Debt / Operator Default: The central risk is the Operator defaulting on the loan, which triggers the need to use the Restaker’s collateral.
  • Liquidation Risk: Volatility in the collateral’s price (the LSTs/LRTs) can push the loan past the Liquidation Threshold, forcing a sale of collateral and potential loss for the Restaker.
  • Oracle Manipulation/Failure: Inaccurate or manipulated price feeds for the collateral could lead to incorrect liquidation decisions, causing losses for either the protocol or the Restakers.

Protocol Mitigations

  • Accreditation and Credit Assessment: Cap aims to mitigate the default risk by requiring Operators to be accredited institutions who pass off-chain, professional credit assessments. This aims to filter out high-risk borrowers.
  • Guarantor Agreement & LTV Buffer: The loan structure involves standard metrics (LTV and Liquidation Threshold). The Restakers have the ability to top up collateral if the loan nears liquidation, giving the Operator time to manage the position and preventing an immediate forced sale.
  • Robust Oracle Solutions: The protocol utilizes robust oracle solutions to fetch accurate prices for the collateral assets and ensure timely and fair liquidation.

The protocol leverages multiple oracle sources for different types of data:

Asset Management & Contagion

  • Asset Separation: The stablecoin funds loaned out come from the protocol’s Reserve/Vault, which is distinct from the collateral held by the Restaker/Operator contracts.
  • Asset Contagion: Bad debt accumulation (i.e., defaults where the slashed collateral is insufficient to cover the loan) creates a direct loss for the protocol. If this loss is significant, it erodes the protocol’s Reserve, which can lead to a contagion risk and de-pegging of the cUSD stablecoin.

3. CDP Minting

Inherent Risks

  • Stablecoin De-Peg Risk: The stablecoin’s peg could break if the value of the underlying collateral falls below the outstanding circulating supply.
  • Collateral Illiquidity: If the collateral (LSTs/LRTs) needs to be sold quickly during a crisis to cover debt, a lack of deep on-chain liquidity could result in massive slippage, causing the sale to realize less value than needed and breaking the peg.

Protocol Mitigations

  • Full Collateralization Mandate: The entire protocol architecture, including the high slashing penalty, is designed to ensure the cUSD stablecoin remains fully backed at all times by highly secure, restaked assets.
  • Restaker Intervention: Restakers can actively manage their risk by adding collateral, which is an external liquidity injection that helps prevent fire sales during periods of high volatility.
  • Institutional Collateral Backing: The acceptance of highly stable, compliant institutional assets (like money market funds) alongside restaked assets aims to provide a reliable, high-quality backing for the stablecoin.

Asset Management & Contagion

  • Contagion from Lending: De-pegging in cap is primarily a result of contagion from the lending/borrowing primitive. If a cascade of Operator defaults overwhelms the slashing mechanism and the Restaker collateral, the protocol’s ability to redeem cUSD for its full value is compromised.

Market & Liquidity Analysis

Entry Barriers:

  • Delegator/Restaker: The main barrier is the capital lockup required to provide the guarantee for an Operator’s loan. Additionally, Restakers must perform due diligence to select a solvent Operator with a viable strategy, as they directly underwrite that Operator’s default risk.
  • Operator: Operators must be accredited institutions and pass an off-chain credit assessment to gain borrowing privileges, which is a significant barrier to entry compared to fully permissionless DeFi protocols.

Exit Barriers (Lockup Periods & Withdrawal Queues):

  • Restaked Collateral: The Delegator/Restaker’s capital is locked up to serve as a performance bond for the duration of the Operator’s loan. To exit the position, the loan must be repaid or the Restaker must underwrite a new Operator.
  • Unbonding Delay: The most significant time barrier is the unbonding period and withdrawal queue of the underlying LST/LRT protocol (e.g., EigenLayer or Symbiotic). When a Restaker initiates a withdrawal, their assets must typically wait through this delay before becoming claimable, exposing them to potential price volatility during the queue time.

Liquidation Triggers and Initiation

Liquidation is a permissionless process open to any external entity (Liquidators).

  • Primary Trigger: An Operator’s loan health factor drops below 1. The health factor is defined as

  • Health Factor=(Total DelegationĂ—Liquidation Threshold​)/Total Debt

  • Initiation: A Liquidator calls the initiateLiquidation function (which maps to the openLiquidation function in the logic library) to start the process.

  • Liquidation Threshold: The default threshold is set at 80% LTV (Loan-to-Value). If the current LTV exceeds this, liquidation can be opened.

The Liquidation Window and Grace Period

The process is structured with a grace period and a definitive expiry window to balance recovery chance with system security.

  • Grace Period: After a liquidation is initiated, the Operator is granted a 12-hour grace period to repay debt or add collateral to improve the loan’s health (i.e., push the health factor above 1). Liquidations cannot execute during this time. The function setGrace allows the admin to change this period.
  • Emergency Liquidation Override: If the loan’s health drops severely, falling below the emergency liquidation threshold (90% LTV), the grace period is immediately overridden, and the liquidation window opens at once.
  • Liquidation Window: If the loan is not recovered during the grace period, the full liquidation window opens and lasts for 3 days after the grace period ends. The function setExpiry controls this period.

Execution and Penalty (The liquidate Function)

The core mechanism involves liquidators repaying the Operator’s debt in exchange for a discounted share of the collateral via slashing.

  • Action: A Liquidator calls the liquidate function, repaying a portion of the Operator’s outstanding debt.
  • Collateral Transfer (Slashing): The repayment amount, plus the liquidation bonus, is slashed from the Shared Security Network collateral delegated to the Operator. This collateral is then transferred to the Liquidator.
  • Goal: Liquidations aim to restore the loan’s health factor to a Target Health level, currently set at 1.25. This provides a safety buffer to prevent the loan from becoming instantly liquidatable again.
  • Maximum Liquidatable Amount: The amount repaid by the liquidator is capped by the maximum liquidatable amount, which is calculated based on the difference required to reach the Target Health of 1.25.
  • Closure: The liquidation window closes immediately once the Operator’s health factor recovers (i.e., reaches or exceeds 1).

Liquidation Bonus (Incentive Structure)

To ensure the system is robust and that liquidators are incentivized to act quickly, the bonus system is dynamic.

  • Dynamic Bonus: The liquidation bonus rises linearly with time throughout the liquidation window, starting from the end of the grace period.
  • Maximum Bonus: The bonus is capped at a maximum amount, currently set to 10% (via the setBonusCap function).
  • Emergency Incentive: If an emergency liquidation is triggered (LTV exceeds the emergency threshold), liquidators immediately earn the maximum 10% bonus, bypassing the standard linear increase.
  • Collateral Availability Check: The protocol prevents over-liquidation by ensuring the liquidation value (debt repaid + bonus) does not exceed the total available slashable collateral.

Liquidation Expiry and Robustness

  • Expiry: Liquidations expire 3 days after the grace period ends. This mechanism ensures that if the position becomes healthy after the initial trigger, the liquidation window is reset. If the health factor remains below 1 after expiry, a new liquidation can be initiated, granting the Operator a fresh grace period.
  • Robustness: The system’s robustness against mass liquidation events is supported by the dynamic and high bonus incentive, which encourages liquidators to compete and act even under market stress, and the immediate bypass of the grace period during emergencies. Furthermore, the goal of achieving a 1.25 Target Health provides a substantial buffer against subsequent price drops.
  • Deposited Asset Liquidity:
    • Price Impact: We observed slippage below 2% when approaching the 95M trade size for cUSD. Beyond this threshold, slippage begins to rise rapidly, which makes liquidating positions of this size costly.
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