Activity Log
Date: 06/07/2026
- [09:52 CET] - @halaprix posted into Telegram DM Group.
- [09:52 CET] - @chrisb created the first emergency Safe transaction to set DAO-Risk-Managed USDC & ETH Ethereum Vault deposit caps to
0.[12:24 CET] - First emergency Safe transaction was executed on Ethereum.
- [09:58 CET] - @chrisb created the second emergency Safe transaction to
pauseall existing (7) Fleets on Ethereum.[12:25 CET] - Second emergency Safe transaction was executed on Ethereum.
- [10:02 CET] - @chrisb posted into Signal DM Group.
- [10:38 CET] - @chrisb created the third emergency Safe transaction to
pauseall existing (3) Fleets on Base.[12:21 CET] - Third emergency Safe transaction was executed on Base.
- [11:10 to 11:45 CET] - multiple Guardians reported Safe frontend issues preventing signing. Alternative browsers, private browsing sessions, WalletConnect, and direct contract interactions were used to restore access.
- [12:33 CET] - @jensei created the fourth emergency Safe transaction to
pauseUSDC.E Fleet on Sonic.[13:41 CET] - Fourth emergency Safe transaction was executed on Sonic.
- [12:39 CET] - @jensei created the fifth emergency Safe transaction to
pauseall existing (2) Fleets on Arbitrum.[13:38 CET] - Fifth emergency Safe transaction was executed on Aribtrum.
- [13:50 CET] - @jensei created the sixth emergency Safe transaction to
cancelpreviously postedpausetransaction due to lack ofguardianRoleon HyperEVM, while requesting Lazy Summer Foundation to executepauseon HyperEVM viagovernorRole.[14:24 CET] - Sixth emergency Safe transaction was executed on HyperEVM.
Background
This series of transactions was proposed as an emergency response following the identification of an active exploit affecting the Lazy Summer Protocol.
Upon confirmation of the incident, the Guardians were immediately notified through both the Telegram and Signal Guardian groups and requested to review and sign a series of transactions designed to pause protocol activity across affected deployments as quickly as possible.
The initial priority was Mainnet, where transactions were submitted to set the deposit caps of both DAO Managed Vaults to zero and pause the affected vaults. Additional pause transactions were subsequently prepared for Base, Arbitrum, Sonic and HyperEVM in order to halt protocol activity across all supported deployments while the incident was being assessed.
During execution, the Guardian group encountered intermittent issues with the Safe frontend, requiring several signers to switch browsers, use WalletConnect, private browsing sessions or the Safe mobile application in order to continue signing. Despite these operational issues, quorum was reached and transactions were executed as quickly as possible across the supported networks.
During the response it was also identified that the Guardian multisig did not possess the required Guardian permissions on HyperEVM. The proposed pause transaction therefore reverted with a CallerIsNotGuardianOrGovernor error. The original transaction was subsequently cancelled and the Lazy Summer Foundation is requested to execute the required pause directly (via governor role) until Guardian permissions on HyperEVM can be addressed.
This event demonstrates the value of maintaining an active Guardian process capable of coordinating rapidly across multiple signers and multiple chains during time-critical protocol incidents, while also highlighting an operational improvement required for the HyperEVM deployment.