This transaction has been proposed as an additional safety measure (not-time-critical) post-Resolv incident - directed at DAO-Risk-Managed USDC Vault.
At the time of the transaction there was no direct exposure to any deposited funds within Lazy Summer Protocol. The keepers were proactively disabled for the vault, with all assets moved to the buffer. Once executed, the keepers can be enabled to continue rebalancing.
The markets set to 0 within the above mentioned transaction were:
RE Ecosystem → no obvious USR exposure, but only 15k deposits and high apy.→ 0x03D92FCaFfaAEde1da335A8D6ACBfA02437d8e8e
This transaction has been proposed as an urgent action to undertake.
There has been a newly created malicious proposal on Governance V1 (by 0xeaef43e4c3f955b1b3c35556c4114f3a5e5cd470) with some old rights - it still has, masking itself as a valid proposal with a valid SIP number. The guardians were engaged to cancel this proposal.
There are no funds at risk, this measure was taken asap so any potential thread of this governance v1 attack is removed before reaching quorum.
[Overnight 20–21/04] - Keepers actively withdrew liquidity from affected markets as it became available.
[10:47 CET, 21/04] - @chrisb provided interim update on partial recovery (~33%) in Telegram DM Group.
[22:47 CET, 21/04] - @chrisb confirmed full exit from affected market and resolution in Telegram DM Group.
Background
Following the Kelp-related exploit over the weekend, an immediate precautionary response was taken across Lazy Summer DAO-Risk-Managed Vaults (DMV). Keeper operations were paused and all accessible liquidity was withdrawn from potentially affected markets back into the vault buffer.
After assessing exposure, a Safe transaction was proposed to set deposit caps to 0 across a set of markets deemed either directly affected or insufficiently liquid to justify continued allocation. This applied to both WETH and USDC DAO Managed Vaults.
A second transaction was subsequently proposed to pause deposits into the ETH DAO Managed Vault. At the time, ~17.22% of vault TVL was allocated to a Morpho SingularV market with indirect exposure to hgETH/rsETH. Based on available data and assumptions, estimated worst-case exposure was ~0.57% of vault TVL.
Importantly, only deposits were paused, withdrawals and rebalancing remained active. This allowed the keeper system to continuously attempt withdrawals as liquidity became available, maximizing recovery.
Over the following ~24 hours, keepers successfully withdrew funds opportunistically, capturing 100% of available liquidity whenever it appeared. This resulted in a full exit from the affected market with no realized losses. Once the position was fully unwound, the situation was considered resolved, with a follow-up proposal to re-enable vault operations to be submitted.
TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE 1ST TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 41 MIN.
TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE 2ND TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 42 MIN.
This transaction has been proposed as a non-critical precautionary action relating to the Fluid Lite ETH Ark within the ETH DAO Risk Managed Vault (DRMV).
The ETH DRMV deposit cap has remained set to 0 for several weeks while awaiting resolution of the withdrawal issues impacting Fluid Lite. During this period, the affected allocation remained isolated while monitoring continued alongside discussions with the Fluid team.
Following the re-enablement of withdrawals by Fluid Lite, a withdrawal request was submitted in order to recover the remaining liquidity from the market.
This additional transaction sets the deposit cap for the Fluid Lite ETH Ark itself to 0. The purpose of this action is to ensure that any liquidity successfully withdrawn from the market is not automatically reallocated back into the same Fluid Lite position by the keeper system during subsequent rebalancing operations.
This action was precautionary in nature and intended purely to support the orderly exit and unwinding of remaining exposure from the Fluid Lite ETH market.
No immediate funds are considered at risk through this action itself, and the transaction is intended to complete the operational offboarding process for this Ark while withdrawal functionality remains available.
TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE BY THE GUARDIANS: 237 MIN.