Guardian Multisig - Transparency Reporting Thread

Hello everyone, this post will be used to continuously update the Lazy Summer DAO and the community on the actions taken by the guardians.

NOTE:

  1. [RFC] Establish Guardian Module & Emergency Risk Controls
  2. [SIP0.2] Establish Guardian Module & Emergency Risk Controls
  3. Multisig: Safe{Wallet} – Dashboard

Activity Log

Date: 23/03/2026

  1. [11:50 CET] - @chrisb built a Safe transaction.
  2. [11:54 CET] - @chrisb posted into Telegram DM Group.
  3. [12:14 CET] - @chrisb posted onto Signal DM Group.
  4. [12:44 CET] - Safe transaction executed.

Background

This transaction has been proposed as an additional safety measure (not-time-critical) post-Resolv incident - directed at DAO-Risk-Managed USDC Vault.

At the time of the transaction there was no direct exposure to any deposited funds within Lazy Summer Protocol. The keepers were proactively disabled for the vault, with all assets moved to the buffer. Once executed, the keepers can be enabled to continue rebalancing.

The markets set to 0 within the above mentioned transaction were:

  1. RE Ecosystem β†’ no obvious USR exposure, but only 15k deposits and high apy.β†’ 0x03D92FCaFfaAEde1da335A8D6ACBfA02437d8e8e
  2. KPK Yield β†’ 0x342158221a8D826fDAbB54Bc3C49b6693ea90659
  3. August V2 β†’ 0x52C4c3cFBB6A97D8a39941cc1e7f2Bc3d34086A4
  4. Fluid β†’ 0x7931745BFe87BdB15FF5c8d7A1E66D87bF207061
  5. Clearstar high yield β†’ 0x873c28f289958a10831aeff5ddf6e41b2df4c0af
  6. Gauntlet Frontier β†’ 0xe84579f0f30400f71031384ca0217bf3ee9c6df7

There are no funds at risk, precautionary measures were taken asap so any funds at risk were quickly removed from affected protocols.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE BY THE GUARDIANS: 54 MIN.

1 Like

Activity Log

Date: 08/04/2026

  1. [11:37 CET] - @chrisb built a Safe transaction.
  2. [12:01 CET] - @chrisb posted into Telegram DM Group.
  3. [12:02 CET] - @chrisb posted into Signal DM Group.
  4. [13:13 CET] - Safe transaction executed.

Background

This transaction has been proposed as an urgent action to undertake.

There has been a newly created malicious proposal on Governance V1 (by 0xeaef43e4c3f955b1b3c35556c4114f3a5e5cd470) with some old rights - it still has, masking itself as a valid proposal with a valid SIP number. The guardians were engaged to cancel this proposal.

There are no funds at risk, this measure was taken asap so any potential thread of this governance v1 attack is removed before reaching quorum.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE BY THE GUARDIANS: 96 MIN.

1 Like

Activity Log

Date: 20-21/04/2026

  1. [14:32 CET] - @chrisb created Safe transaction (set caps on 4 ETH and 4 USDC ARKs to 0 for ETH DMV) .
  2. [14:38 CET] - @chrisb posted into Telegram DM Group.
  3. [14:46 CET] - @chrisb posted into Signal DM Group.
  4. [15:13 CET] - Safe transaction executed.
  5. [15:57 CET] - @chrisb created a second Safe transaction (pause deposits to ETH DMV).
  6. [16:20 CET] - @chrisb posted into Telegram DM Group.
  7. [16:21 CET] - @chrisb posted into Signal DM Group.
  8. [16:39 CET] - Safe transaction executed.
  9. [Overnight 20–21/04] - Keepers actively withdrew liquidity from affected markets as it became available.
  10. [10:47 CET, 21/04] - @chrisb provided interim update on partial recovery (~33%) in Telegram DM Group.
  11. [22:47 CET, 21/04] - @chrisb confirmed full exit from affected market and resolution in Telegram DM Group.

Background

Following the Kelp-related exploit over the weekend, an immediate precautionary response was taken across Lazy Summer DAO-Risk-Managed Vaults (DMV). Keeper operations were paused and all accessible liquidity was withdrawn from potentially affected markets back into the vault buffer.

After assessing exposure, a Safe transaction was proposed to set deposit caps to 0 across a set of markets deemed either directly affected or insufficiently liquid to justify continued allocation. This applied to both WETH and USDC DAO Managed Vaults.

A second transaction was subsequently proposed to pause deposits into the ETH DAO Managed Vault. At the time, ~17.22% of vault TVL was allocated to a Morpho SingularV market with indirect exposure to hgETH/rsETH. Based on available data and assumptions, estimated worst-case exposure was ~0.57% of vault TVL.

Importantly, only deposits were paused, withdrawals and rebalancing remained active. This allowed the keeper system to continuously attempt withdrawals as liquidity became available, maximizing recovery.

Over the following ~24 hours, keepers successfully withdrew funds opportunistically, capturing 100% of available liquidity whenever it appeared. This resulted in a full exit from the affected market with no realized losses. Once the position was fully unwound, the situation was considered resolved, with a follow-up proposal to re-enable vault operations to be submitted.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE 1ST TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 41 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE 2ND TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 42 MIN.

1 Like

Activity Log

Date: 19/05/2026

  1. [10:45 CET] - @chrisb created Safe transaction (set ark deposit cap to 0 for ETH DRMV)
  2. [10:47 CET] - @chrisb posted into Telegram DM Group.
  3. [10:47 CET] - @chrisb posted into Signal DM Group.
  4. [14:42 CET] - Safe transaction executed.

Background

This transaction has been proposed as a non-critical precautionary action relating to the Fluid Lite ETH Ark within the ETH DAO Risk Managed Vault (DRMV).

The ETH DRMV deposit cap has remained set to 0 for several weeks while awaiting resolution of the withdrawal issues impacting Fluid Lite. During this period, the affected allocation remained isolated while monitoring continued alongside discussions with the Fluid team.

Following the re-enablement of withdrawals by Fluid Lite, a withdrawal request was submitted in order to recover the remaining liquidity from the market.

This additional transaction sets the deposit cap for the Fluid Lite ETH Ark itself to 0. The purpose of this action is to ensure that any liquidity successfully withdrawn from the market is not automatically reallocated back into the same Fluid Lite position by the keeper system during subsequent rebalancing operations.

This action was precautionary in nature and intended purely to support the orderly exit and unwinding of remaining exposure from the Fluid Lite ETH market.

No immediate funds are considered at risk through this action itself, and the transaction is intended to complete the operational offboarding process for this Ark while withdrawal functionality remains available.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE BY THE GUARDIANS: 237 MIN.

Activity Log

Date: 06/07/2026

  1. [09:52 CET] - @halaprix posted into Telegram DM Group.
  2. [09:52 CET] - @chrisb created the first emergency Safe transaction to set DAO-Risk-Managed USDC & ETH Ethereum Vault deposit caps to 0.

    [12:24 CET] - First emergency Safe transaction was executed on Ethereum.

  3. [09:58 CET] - @chrisb created the second emergency Safe transaction to pause all existing (7) Fleets on Ethereum.

    [12:25 CET] - Second emergency Safe transaction was executed on Ethereum.

  4. [10:02 CET] - @chrisb posted into Signal DM Group.
  5. [10:38 CET] - @chrisb created the third emergency Safe transaction to pause all existing (3) Fleets on Base.

    [12:21 CET] - Third emergency Safe transaction was executed on Base.

  6. [11:10 to 11:45 CET] - multiple Guardians reported Safe frontend issues preventing signing. Alternative browsers, private browsing sessions, WalletConnect, and direct contract interactions were used to restore access.
  7. [12:33 CET] - @jensei created the fourth emergency Safe transaction to pause USDC.E Fleet on Sonic.

    [13:41 CET] - Fourth emergency Safe transaction was executed on Sonic.

  8. [12:39 CET] - @jensei created the fifth emergency Safe transaction to pause all existing (2) Fleets on Arbitrum.

    [13:38 CET] - Fifth emergency Safe transaction was executed on Aribtrum.

  9. [13:50 CET] - @jensei created the sixth emergency Safe transaction to cancel previously posted pause transaction due to lack of guardianRole on HyperEVM, while requesting Lazy Summer Foundation to execute pause on HyperEVM via governorRole.

    [14:24 CET] - Sixth emergency Safe transaction was executed on HyperEVM.


Background

This series of transactions was proposed as an emergency response following the identification of an active exploit affecting the Lazy Summer Protocol.

Upon confirmation of the incident, the Guardians were immediately notified through both the Telegram and Signal Guardian groups and requested to review and sign a series of transactions designed to pause protocol activity across affected deployments as quickly as possible.

The initial priority was Mainnet, where transactions were submitted to set the deposit caps of both DAO Managed Vaults to zero and pause the affected vaults. Additional pause transactions were subsequently prepared for Base, Arbitrum, Sonic and HyperEVM in order to halt protocol activity across all supported deployments while the incident was being assessed.

During execution, the Guardian group encountered intermittent issues with the Safe frontend, requiring several signers to switch browsers, use WalletConnect, private browsing sessions or the Safe mobile application in order to continue signing. Despite these operational issues, quorum was reached and transactions were executed as quickly as possible across the supported networks.

During the response it was also identified that the Guardian multisig did not possess the required Guardian permissions on HyperEVM. The proposed pause transaction therefore reverted with a CallerIsNotGuardianOrGovernor error. The original transaction was subsequently cancelled and the Lazy Summer Foundation is requested to execute the required pause directly (via governor role) until Guardian permissions on HyperEVM can be addressed.

This event demonstrates the value of maintaining an active Guardian process capable of coordinating rapidly across multiple signers and multiple chains during time-critical protocol incidents, while also highlighting an operational improvement required for the HyperEVM deployment.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE ETHEREUM 1ST TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 152 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE ETHEREUM 2ND TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 147 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE BASE TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 103 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE SONIC TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 68 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE ARBITRUM TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 59 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE HYPEREVM TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 34 MIN.

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Activity Log

Date: 24/07/2026

  1. [11:19 CET] - @jensei created the first Safe transaction to set all Arks deposit caps to 0 across the USDC and WETH DAO Risk Managed Vaults (DRMV).
  2. [11:19 CET] - @jensei posted into the Telegram and Signal DM Groups.
  3. [11:34 CET] - @jensei created a second set of Safe transactions to change the signer threshold from 6/8 to 4/8 across all seven deployments.
  4. [11:34 CET] - @jensei posted into the Telegram and Signal DM Groups.
  5. [15:19 CET] - First Safe transaction was executed on Ethereum.

Threshold change transactions, by network:

Network Safe Executed link
Ethereum link [15:19 CET] tx
Optimism link [15:23 CET] tx
Unichain link [15:24 CET] tx
Sonic link [15:27 CET] tx
HyperEVM link [15:12 CET] tx
Base link [15:10 CET] tx
Arbitrum link [15:10 CET] tx

Background

Two separate, non-time-critical actions were proposed to the Guardian set on this date.

1. Ark deposit caps set to 0 on the USDC and WETH DAO Risk Managed Vaults.

This transaction set the deposit cap of every Ark within the USDC and WETH DAO Risk Managed Vaults (both Higher Risk) to 0. With all Ark caps at 0, the keeper system withdraws funds out of the underlying markets and holds them in the vault Buffer. The purpose of this action is to ensure that the full balance of both vaults is available as instant liquidity, so that any user wishing to redeem is able to do so immediately rather than waiting on market-level withdrawal capacity.

This action does not restrict withdrawals or redemptions in any way, and no funds are considered at risk as a result of it.

2. Signer threshold reduced from 6/8 to 4/8.

The Guardian multisig has to date required six of eight signatures to execute. During the discussion of [SIP0.3] Renew Guardian Module Mandate & Re-confirm Guardian Set, several signers proposed lowering this to 4/8, and these transactions implement that change.

The rationale raised in that discussion is that due to the limited abilities / powers of the guardian it is of high importance to act quicker in emergencies.

The Guardian mandate remains limited to the emergency risk controls defined in [SIP0.2] Establish Guardian Module & Emergency Risk Controls and [SIP0.3] Renew Guardian Module Mandate & Re-confirm Guardian Set. This change affects only the number of signatures required to execute within that existing mandate; it does not expand the scope of what the Guardians are permitted to do.*

The change was applied identically across all seven deployments (Ethereum, Optimism, Unichain, Sonic, HyperEVM, Base and Arbitrum) so that the multisig configuration remains consistent chain-to-chain.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE ARK DEPOSIT CAP TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 240 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE ETHEREUM THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 226 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE OPTIMISM THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 230 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE UNICHAIN THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 231 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE SONIC THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 234 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE HYPEREVM THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 219 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE BASE THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 217 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE ARBITRUM THRESHOLD TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 216 MIN.

Activity Log

Date: 05/08/2026 - 06/08/2026

  1. [05/08 - 15:22 CET] - @jensei created a Safe transaction on Base to claim the Merkl accrued rewards on behalf of the Timelock, as authorized by [SIP5.24].
  2. [05/08 - 15:22 CET] - @jensei posted into the Telegram and Signal DM Groups.
  3. [05/08 - 15:33 CET] - @jensei followed up in both groups to flag that the transaction was non-emergency but time sensitive, as it reverts once a new Merkl reward root is published.

The transaction did not reach quorum before its reward root was superseded and therefore expired without being executed.

  1. [06/08 - 13:06 CET] - @jensei created a rejection transaction to clear the expired transaction from the queue, and a resubmitted claim transaction against the current root.
  2. [06/08 - 13:06 CET] - @jensei posted into the Telegram and Signal DM Groups, noting the approximately two hour window in which claim transactions remain valid and asking signers to simulate and sign at their earliest convenience.
  3. [06/08 - 13:43 CET] - Rejection transaction was executed on Base.
  4. [06/08 - 13:46 CET] - Resubmitted claim transaction was executed on Base.

Claimed into the DAO Treasury:

Asset Amount
SUMR 762,887.1296
USDC 17.4189

Background

Scope of the action:

[SIP5.24] authorized the Guardian Operator to claim SUMR and USDC accrued through Merkl on behalf of the Timelock. The claim routes the rewards directly to the DAO Treasury; the Guardians have no discretion over the destination or the amount, both of which are fixed by the Merkl distribution and the claim calldata itself.

Why the first transaction expired:

Merkl claims are validated against a Merkle proof that is periodically refreshed. Once the proof is superseded, any claim transaction built against the previous one reverts. In practice this leaves a window of roughly two hours in which a queued claim remains executable.

The transaction proposed on 05/08 at 15:22 CET did not collect enough signatures before its proof expired, so it could no longer be executed and had to be refreshed and resubmitted. No funds were at risk and no value was lost as a result (an expired claim simply reverts), and the underlying rewards remain claimable against the refreshed proof. The stale transaction was left in the queue overnight and cleared the following day.

Resolution:

On 06/08 a rejection transaction was proposed to clear the stale nonce, followed by a fresh claim built against the then-current root. Both reached quorum and executed within 40 minutes of being posted, and the rewards were claimed into the Treasury as authorized.

Signer threshold:

These were the first transactions executed under the 4/8 signer threshold adopted on 24/07/2026, replacing the previous 6/8. Both the rejection and the resubmitted claim reached quorum and executed within 40 minutes of being posted to the signer groups, against 216 to 240 minutes for the non-urgent transactions proposed on 24/07 under the old threshold.

The comparison should be read with the usual caveat that response time depends heavily on signer availability at the moment of proposal, and a single data point is not evidence on its own. It is nonetheless consistent with the reasoning raised during the [SIP0.3] discussion, that assembling quorum rather than reviewing the transaction has been the binding constraint on Guardian response time.

Note for future claims:

This was the first claim executed under [SIP5.24] and the expiry is a useful data point: the two hour validity window is short relative to normal Guardian coordination time. Future claims will be flagged in advance in the signer groups so that signers can be on hand when the transaction is proposed, rather than the transaction waiting on signer availability.


TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE INITIAL CLAIM TX BY THE GUARDIANS: NOT EXECUTED / EXPIRED

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE REJECTION TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 38 MIN.

TIME TO RESPOND/EXECUTE RESUBMITTED CLAIM TX BY THE GUARDIANS: 40 MIN.

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