Delegate Incentive Working Group (DI-WG) Transparency Thread

DIWG Update: Sync 1 & RFC Publication

Following up on our last update, the DIWG shifted from conceptual alignment to defining the hard math and mechanics. We hosted our first official working group sync (DIWG Sync #1), finalized the draft models, and officially published the V2 Delegate Rewards Framework as an RFC on the forum.

Below is a breakdown of our progress, the mechanics we locked in, and the open questions we are actively discussing.


1. DIWG Sync 1: Locking the Mechanics

During our working group sync, we took the feedback from the Miro workshops and structured it into a cohesive economic model:

  • Budget Cap: Set a strict budget cap of $4,200 per quarter (or $1,400 USD/month) to sustainably reward delegates without depleting the treasury.

  • Pricing Mechanism: SUMR payouts will be calculated at the start of each month using a 7-Day Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP).

  • Dual-Pool Split: Divided the budget into an 85% baseline voting pool to secure quorum, and a 15% contribution pool for high-value forum work.

  • Baseline Eligibility: Required a strict 80% minimum voting participation rate to be eligible for any rewards.

  • PRS Utilization: Restricted the $200 contribution pool exclusively to the top 3 ranked delegates to keep the reward financially impactful and competitive.

  • Success Metrics: Curia will publish a quarterly report tracking Governance Stability, Forum Contributions, Decentralization Growth, Protocol Impact, and Monthly Top Contributors.

Open Questions for Community Discussion:

While the foundational parameters above are locked, there were still a few key items we needed broader delegate input on before finalizing the proposal:

  • Voting Power Threshold: Should we use 60k SUMR (a proportional increase) vs. 500k–1M SUMR (a high-conviction threshold)?

  • 100% Voting Bonus: Should delegates achieving perfect participation receive an extra bonus from Pool B?

  • Pool Split: The DIWG landed on 85/15. Is this the right balance, or would a 70/30 or 60/40 split better elevate contribution quality at the risk of quorum protection?

  • Core Team Eligibility: Should core Labs team members be eligible for Pool B contribution rewards, or should this be strictly reserved for independent delegates to encourage decentralization?

  • Technical Execution & Buffer: Should we prioritize Superfluid streaming (which requires a 10% volatility buffer) or use standard Tally retroactive lump-sums (which saves the treasury the 10% premium but lacks continuous streaming)?


2. RFC Publication & Forum Consensus

We officially published the V2 Framework RFC to gather feedback from the broader delegate community to answer the open questions above.

Check out the proposal here: [RFC] Delegate Rewards Framework V2


Next Steps

  • Gather initial feedback from the RFC thread.

  • Meet with the DIWG to review the community’s responses, revise the RFC, and finalize the PRS parameters.

  • Format the finalized framework into a formal SIP and push it to a Tally vote.

The DIWG believes this framework perfectly balances community feedback with technical and financial reality. Please drop any final questions or concerns below!

Thank you for building alongside us.

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