1. Summary:
This SIP proposes updating two core governance parameters within the Lazy Summer DAO Governor contract:
- Increase governance quorum from 15% to 30% of voting supply.
- Increase the proposal creation threshold from 10,000 stSUMR to 100,000 stSUMR.
These changes are intended to strengthen governance security, improve resistance to governance capture, and better align protocol governance with the current distribution of delegated voting power.
This proposal follows the discussion and feedback gathered in the preceding [RFC] Adjusting Governance Quorum & Proposal Threshold.
2. Motivation:
When the current governance parameters were established, the DAO was operating at a smaller scale with lower delegated voting participation and fewer governance stakeholders.
Since then:
- Governance participation has grown substantially.
- Delegated voting power has become increasingly concentrated among a small number of large delegates.
- The protocol now manages a larger treasury, more vault strategies, and a broader operational scope.
- Governance decisions increasingly impact protocol security, treasury management, incentive systems, and user funds.
Under the current configuration:
- Quorum is set at 15% of voting supply.
- Proposal threshold is set at 10,000 stSUMR.
While these settings were appropriate during earlier stages of DAO growth, they no longer reflect the current governance landscape. Increasing quorum and proposal thresholds introduces stronger governance safeguards while maintaining accessibility for active delegates and contributors. The objective of this SIP is not to reduce governance activity, but rather to ensure that governance outcomes continue to reflect broad stakeholder participation as the protocol scales.
3. Specification:
3.1 Governance Parameter Changes
| Parameter | Current Value | Proposed Value |
|---|---|---|
| Quorum | 15% | 30% |
| Proposal Threshold | 10,000 stSUMR | 100,000 stSUMR |
3.2 Implementation
The proposal updates the Governor contract directly through two governance actions executed by the Timelock after successful passage.
Governor Contract: Address: 0x4ceee1b6...d5f2c3274 | BaseScan
3.2.1 Increase Quorum
Updates the quorum numerator from 15 → 30.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Function | updateQuorumNumerator(uint256) |
| Target | 0x4cEeE1b6289624d381383C1Bb42B118d5f2c3274 |
| Value | 0 |
| Argument | 30 |
| Calldata | 0x06f3f9e6000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001e |
3.2.2 Increase Proposal Threshold
Updates the proposal submission threshold from 10,000 stSUMR → 100,000 stSUMR.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Function | setProposalThreshold(uint256) |
| Target | 0x4cEeE1b6289624d381383C1Bb42B118d5f2c3274 |
| Value | 0 |
| Argument | 100,000 stSUMR |
| Calldata | 0xece40cc100000000000000000000000000000000000000000152d02c7e14af6800000 |
4. Risk Assessment:
4.1 Governance Participation Risk
Increasing quorum creates a higher participation requirement for proposal passage.
While this may modestly increase governance coordination requirements, current levels of delegated voting power suggest the DAO can support a higher quorum without materially impairing governance operations.
4.2 Proposal Creation Friction
Increasing the proposal threshold introduces additional friction for proposal authors.
However, 100,000 stSUMR remains achievable through delegation, working group coordination, contributor alignment, or sponsorship from recognized delegates.
4.3 Governance Security Benefits
The proposal provides several security improvements:
- Stronger resistance to governance capture.
- Reduced influence from isolated voting blocs.
- Increased requirement for broad delegate participation.
- Better alignment between governance security and current protocol scale.
Overall, the expected security benefits outweigh the relatively minor increase in governance coordination costs.
5. Voting
If YES - Increase quorum and proposal threshold.
If NO - Keep the current governance parameters unchanged.
@Recognized_Delegates, please provide any additional risk assessment or comments prior to onchain publication.
–jensei