Per your request, some other proposals for avoiding a day-one dump:
- A 3 month vest, as proposed here and in the original bundled RFC.
- In fact, any length of vest technically accomplishes your stated goal of avoiding a day one dump - but 3 seemed to me like the happy compromise among prenegotiated options.
- The rollout of the reimbursement can be linear (day-by-day unlock over 3mo) or periodic (at t=30d/60d/90d), each of which staggers total tokens being freely traded. Whatever the approach, the design of vesting leaves room for mitigating dumping; the length of vesting may also prevent dumping, but simultaneously punishes affected lenders.
- An alternative reimbursement plan that delivers whole or partial compensation in USDC, plausible over a longer timeline.
- V2 staking shows us Lazy Summer DAO is comfortable allocating 20% of future earnings to stakers in USDC.
- A similar plan could be explored for this incident specifically, or as part of an ongoing insurance fund (which would take on some or part of this affected lender liability).
- Pre-staking SUMR allotted to affected lenders for a 1-3 month period, allow it to earn yield while waiting to be unlocked.
- This is primarily meant to clearly signal to affected lenders “your SUMR can work for you, you don’t have to sell it!” NOT to lengthen the ultimate implied vest timeline.
- Without intending to sound sarcastic: continue building a great protocol that stands by its core promises, continues to generates “set and forget” returns for an ever-growing pool of depositors who have faith in the safety of their savings, gradually growing TVL, and ultimately causing SUMR price appreciation.
- Nothing says “HODL” like the token value going up.
I’m open to hearing further alternatives, but I think my original proposal and the ones above meet and exceed the criteria of avoiding a “massive market dump on day one”.