# \[SIP3.20\] Wind-down SUMR lock buckets and sunset the early-unstake penalty

**URL:** <https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip3-20-wind-down-sumr-lock-buckets-and-sunset-the-early-unstake-penalty/903>\
**Category:** Summer Improvement Proposals \[SIPs\]\
**Tags:** sumr, sip3, staking, sumr-staking, sunset\
**Created:** [August 3, 2026, 2:37pm UTC](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip3-20-wind-down-sumr-lock-buckets-and-sunset-the-early-unstake-penalty/903 "2026-08-03T14:37:54Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 3\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![jensei](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex009/user_avatar/forum.summer.fi/jensei/32/69_2.png) [@jensei](https://forum.summer.fi/u/jensei)\
**Post date:** [August 3, 2026, 2:37pm UTC](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip3-20-wind-down-sumr-lock-buckets-and-sunset-the-early-unstake-penalty/903/1 "2026-08-03T14:37:54Z")

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> **Connected RFC:** [[RFC] Operational Realignment for the Transition Period](https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875)

* * *

### 1. Overview:

Reconfigure SUMR Staking V2 so the lockup system winds down cleanly, in two governor-only parameter changes:

1. **`NoLockup` bucket cap → `type(uint256).max`** (uncapped); staking remains fully open at the no-lockup tier.
2. **All six lockup bucket caps → `0`** (disabled); no new lockups of any duration can be created.
3. **`updatePenaltyEnabled(false)`** → the early-unstake penalty no longer applies, so existing lockers can exit without a fee.

> **No existing stake is closed, moved, or altered by this proposal, and no voting power is confiscated.** Staking stays open, so governance participation is preserved.

* * *

### 2. Motivation:

[[RFC] Operational Realignment for the Transition Period](https://forum.summer.fi/t/rfc-operational-realignment-for-the-transition-period/875) (A2) set out the case for ending the SUMR Staking V2 reward programs: SUMR emissions run to `periodFinish` and are not renewed, and the USDC revenue share is discontinued. It also stated the fairness principle this SIP implements, that **the early-unstake penalty should be waived first, so lockers are not trapped between an unrewarded lock and a penalized exit.** Poll A2.2 carried a separate signal on exactly that.

 ![Screenshot 2026-08-03 at 16.26.42](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex009/uploads/summer/original/1X/3c5fb05e6fb615554fb3977050ad65813a613f64.png)

The bucket change applies the same logic one step earlier in the lifecycle. A lockup is a bilateral bargain: the staker forgoes liquidity for up to three years, and the DAO compensates that with a quadratic reward multiplier funded by emissions and revenue share. With both sides of that compensation ending, continuing to _issue_ new lockups would bind users into commitments the DAO has already decided not to pay for. Disabling those buckets stops new entrants taking the trade; uncapping `NoLockup` keeps staking, delegation and voting fully available.

* * *

### 3. Specification:

#### 3.1 Parameters

| Parameter | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Contract | `SummerStaking` → `0xcA2e14c7C03C9961c296C89e2d2279F5F7DB15b4` |
| Network | Base |
| Related | `StakedSummerToken` (stSUMR) `0x7cC488F2681cFC2A5E8A00184bfA94ea6d520D1c` |
| Authority | `onlyGovernor` → executes via `SummerTimelockController` `0x447BF9d1485ABDc4C1778025DfdfbE8b894C3796` |
| Execution | Base governor → Timelock (direct on Base hub, no LayerZero relay) |
| Calls | 7 × `updateLockupBucketCap` + 1 × `updatePenaltyEnabled` = **8** |
| Risk level | Low technically; the material consideration is governance/quorum (§4) |

#### 3.2 Calls

Function signatures, verified:

```auto
function updateLockupBucketCap(Bucket _bucket, uint256 _newCap) external onlyGovernor;
function updatePenaltyEnabled(bool _penaltyEnabled) external onlyGovernor;

```

`Bucket` enum values, verified in order:

| # | Bucket | Lockup range | New cap | Effect |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 | `NoLockup` | 0 seconds | `type(uint256).max` | **Uncapped — staking stays fully open** |
| 1 | `ShortTerm` | 1 second – 14 days | `0` | Disabled _(already 0 by default)_ |
| 2 | `TwoWeeksToThreeMonths` | \>14 – 90 days | `0` | Disabled |
| 3 | `ThreeToSixMonths` | \>90 – 180 days | `0` | Disabled |
| 4 | `SixToTwelveMonths` | \>180 – 365 days | `0` | Disabled |
| 5 | `OneToTwoYears` | \>365 – 730 days | `0` | Disabled |
| 6 | `TwoToThreeYears` | \>730 – 1095 days | `0` | Disabled |

`updatePenaltyEnabled(false)` — disables the early-unstake penalty.

`type(uint256).max` = `115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935` (`0xff…ff`, 32 bytes).

Cap semantics are explicit in the contract: `cap == 0` disables a bucket (any positive stake reverts with `Staking_BucketCapExceeded`); `cap == type(uint256).max` means unlimited.

#### 3.3 Verified effects

- **Existing stakes are untouched.** Bucket caps are enforced **only on the stake path** (`_stakeLockup` → `_wouldExceedBucketCap` → revert). `updateLockupBucketCap` writes `bucketData[_bucket].cap` and emits `LockupBucketUpdated`; it does not iterate positions, alter `lockupEndTime`, or move tokens. Setting a cap to `0` blocks _new_ entries and does nothing to existing ones.
- **Voting power is not affected by bucket choice.** stSUMR is minted **1:1 on the raw staked amount**. The quadratic multiplier (`WEIGHTED_STAKE_BASE + WEIGHTED_STAKE_COEFFICIENT × t²`) applies to the _weighted_ balance that drives **rewards accounting only** - bucket caps are applied to the unweighted amount. Since `StakedSummerToken` is the `ERC20Votes` token, a staker’s governance weight is their raw stake regardless of lockup tier. **Disabling lockup buckets therefore does not change anyone’s voting power.**
- **Penalty disablement is a clean boolean.** `penaltyEnabled = false` makes `calculatePenaltyPercentage` return 0. The penalty is _not_ burned - `_handleTokenTransfersOnUnstake` sends the penalty to `treasury()`. Disabling it means early exits no longer route a fee to the treasury.
- **Penalty being removed, for the record:** fixed **2%** if remaining lockup \< `FIXED_PENALTY_PERIOD` (110 days), otherwise linear `timeRemaining / MAX_LOCKUP_PERIOD × 20%`, i.e. up to **20%** at three years. After lockup ends, and for `NoLockup`, the penalty is already 0.
- **Reversible.** Both setters are governor-callable in either direction; a later SIP can restore caps or re-enable the penalty.

* * *

### 4. Risk Assessment:

**Technical: low.** Two governor-only setters on one contract, on one chain, no relay. No funds move, no roles granted, no positions closed, no user action required. Failure mode is a revert. Guardian pre-review of decoded calldata.

**Governance/quorum:** Voting power under Governance V2 is stSUMR, so it is unaffected by _bucket_ changes. Removing the penalty gives every locked staker an unpenalized exit at once, and with rewards ending there is little reason to stay. A large voluntary exit would reduce total stSUMR and therefore quorum.

**Economic.** Unpenalized exits may increase circulating SUMR and create sell pressure, and the DAO treasury is heavily SUMR-weighted. The treasury also forgoes future penalty income (which, with rewards ending, is a fee charged on people leaving a program the DAO has itself discontinued). Both are foreseeable consequences of the fairness decision rather than arguments against it.

**Conflict of interest.** Delegates voting on this are voting on terms affecting their own staked positions and voting weight. Worth stating on the record, as RFC did for delegate compensation.

* * *

### 5. Voting:

> If **YES** - set the `NoLockup` bucket cap to `type(uint256).max`, set all six lockup bucket caps to `0`, and call `updatePenaltyEnabled(false)`, per the decoded calldata published in this thread.

> If **NO** - leave the staking bucket configuration and early-unstake penalty as they are.

* * *

Tagging [@Recognized\_Delegates](https://forum.summer.fi/groups/recognized_delegates) for a checkup as always.

–jensei

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**Author:** ![Sixty](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex009/user_avatar/forum.summer.fi/sixty/32/115_2.png) [@Sixty](https://forum.summer.fi/u/Sixty)\
**Post date:** [August 4, 2026, 12:39pm UTC](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip3-20-wind-down-sumr-lock-buckets-and-sunset-the-early-unstake-penalty/903/2 "2026-08-04T12:39:40Z")

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Hey @jensei, with no lock-up required, but staking remaining open in the `NoLockup` bucket, wouldn’t this technically create a much bigger surface for a governance attack on the protocol?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![jensei](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex009/user_avatar/forum.summer.fi/jensei/32/69_2.png) [@jensei](https://forum.summer.fi/u/jensei)\
**Post date:** [August 5, 2026, 8:53am UTC](https://forum.summer.fi/t/sip3-20-wind-down-sumr-lock-buckets-and-sunset-the-early-unstake-penalty/903/3 "2026-08-05T08:53:48Z")

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hey @Sixty, this is a very fair comment and indeed there is a potential for this. At the same time in a way, even with the penalty and different buckets anyone was able to unstake / stake to influence their voting power.

**I think the main defenses remain fairly strong:**

1. timestamp-snapshot voting (so no single-block flash attack)
2. `proposalThreshold` (dependent on SUMR price, atm very low: 100,000 SUMR =~ $10)
3. the timelock delays, and
4. the Guardian module’s ability to cancel.