Hello. When next step ?
3 Likes
Folks, we’re days away from transferability. Unless major contentions remain, I urge us to move towards a formal on-chain vote with the following options, based on voting activity & discussion in this RFC and the original, all-inclusive discussion:
On Reimbursement:
- Full
- 84% proportional slashing
- No reimbursement
On vesting: 3 month vest written into the proposal
Avoiding dumping can be easily accomplished through the design of vesting (daily vest, monthly unlocks, etc), versus by adjusting the term.
3 Likes
we still need to figure out the price of SUMR to be able to calculate those reimbursements, right? or am I missing something here? not sure if I see clear benefit of promoting this RFC to an SIP without those specific numbers in place
3 Likes
yes.. wait for after TGE.. people will have to wait to sell them anyway
1 Like
How does the sobering price performance of SUMR now impact a potential reimbursement?
1 Like
How do I vote on on-chain vote? And is there some mechanisms ensuring that only affected addreses can vote?
As a recovery solution, I propose that the team allocate a flexible pool of tokens specifically to fully reimburse victims in USDC value, distributed over 8–16 months.
A fixed-token reimbursement is a potential trap; inflationary tokenomics could easily reduce our recovery to 5–20 cents on the dollar. By diluting general rewards to prioritize victim restitution, the protocol creates a ‘Safe Haven’ precedent—proving to future users that losses are made whole, not just discarded via diluted tokens.
If the team insists on a token-only plan, the allocation must be substantially higher than a 1:1 FDV ratio to account for dilution. However, a gradual, USDC-pegged reimbursement of the $1.4M loss is the only way to ensure the LP remains stable while the victims are truly made whole
3 Likes
This is not how DAOs work.
That would make it extremely bias.
1 Like
This is certainly a possiblilty . The token could recover, but it needs buying.
Perhaps the next few SIPs should focus on ways to protect the SUMR price now that the LP is live.
The Mercenary LPs are not going to leave while the juice is better than elsewhere.
And now, they can autocompound eaiser.
1 Like
Totally valid point! 
Hello,
The SUMR token has now been live for a few days, yet this thread has gone quiet and there is still no clear next step or timeline communicated.
For affected lenders, the most difficult part at this stage is not even the outcome itself, but the lack of visibility. We need to understand whether this RFC is actively moving forward, stalled, or waiting on a specific trigger.
More than anything, what matters now is the signal: that the DAO and the team have a clear intention to move this to the next phase and resolve it, rather than letting it slowly fade out.
Could we please get clarity on:
• what the next concrete step is,
• who is expected to take it,
• and on what timeline?
Even an indicative roadmap would go a long way in restoring confidence that this process is still alive and progressing.
Thanks.
4 Likes
I second this, I would rather hear harsh trush than having false hope of funds being recovered
1 Like
Update & Reality Check on Reimbursement Feasibility
Hey everyone, I want to provide a transparent update on where things stand today from my POV, based on the current state of the Lazy Summer DAO treasury and the SUMR market.
First, some concrete numbers to ground this discussion:
- Total user exposure (USDC): 1,494,630.59 USDC
- SUMR FDV (30.01.2026): ~$6,841,548
- SUMR liquidity (30.01.2026): ~$325,336
- SUMR price (30.01.2026): ~$0.006701
- SUMR held by DAO Treasury: ~123,426,683 SUMR = ~$844,361.94
Impact on the DAO Treasury
At current market conditions, reimbursing the affected vault; even at the 84% baseline (1,255,489.6956 USDC), let alone 100%; would require selling a very large (187,358,000 SUMR) portion of the DAO’s entire SUMR holdings. Actually it surpasses the DAO holding (123,426,683 SUMR) at todays market price.
To be very clear and honest with everyone here:
- A reimbursement at today’s price would effectively drain the DAO treasury.
- It would place extreme sell pressure on a market with ~$329k of liquidity.
- The outcome would likely be catastrophic for SUMR price, existing holders, future protocol funding, and the DAO’s ability to operate.
This is not a question of willingness or empathy, it’s a question of basic feasibility. At today’s valuation, the DAO simply does not have the financial capacity to absorb a ~$1.5M USDC-equivalent obligation without self-destructing.
On Precedent & Protocol Risk
I also want to explicitly highlight the precedent this sets.
If the DAO assumes full downside for vault losses retroactively, we are effectively shifting all protocol risk away from users and onto the DAO/token holders. That is not how DeFi has been designed to function, and it introduces severe moral hazard for future vault design, risk-taking, and governance decisions.
This was already discussed earlier in the thread, but it becomes even more important now that we see the hard numbers.
Where Reimbursement Responsibility Ultimately Sits
It’s also important to restate something clearly:
- Silo Finance is the protocol that holds the debt receipts.
- If those receipts were ever made whole (or partially recovered) at the Silo level, they would again become withdrawable.
This is not unique to Lazy Summer Protocol; but it does mean that any recovery path realistically needs to involve Silo Finance, not only Lazy Summer DAO.
Where This Leaves Us
Given the above, I want to be upfront:
- Immediate reimbursement at current prices is unfeasible.
- Pushing this through now would very likely leave everyone worse off; including affected users.
- At the same time, I do not believe this discussion should be abandoned or swept under the rug.
What does seem reasonable is to postpone, not dismiss, the idea, and revisit it when market conditions materially change, i.e.:
- Higher SUMR price
- Deeper liquidity
- Healthier DAO treasury
- Clearer recovery signals (if any) from Silo
Calling for Delegate Input
I’d really like to invite input and ideas from our @Recognized_Delegates here on:
- Whether postponement with explicit criteria makes sense.
- What signals would justify reopening reimbursement discussions in the future,
- and whether there are creative, non-destructive paths forward that don’t zero out the DAO?
Tagging for visibility and input: @Recognized_Delegates @BlockAnalitica, and anyone else who has been deeply involved in risk and governance discussions.
I know this is an incredibly sensitive topic. People here lost real money, and frustration is entirely understandable. My goal with this update is not to shut the door, but to anchor expectations in reality so we don’t replace uncertainty with false hope.
Appreciate everyone who has stayed engaged, respectful, and constructive through a very difficult discussion.
1 Like
With all due respect, Jensei, your update presents a false dilemma that forces the community to choose between the survival of the DAO and the basic protection of its users. By framing the choice as an immediate, one hundred percent treasury drain, you are intentionally leaving out viable options to make the situation look more dire than it is.
The idea that we must sell everything today is an artificial constraint. A more responsible approach is to acknowledge the debt and pay it back over a long-term horizon, such as six to eighteen months. By using programmatic emissions or a dedicated portion of protocol fees, the sell pressure becomes negligible and can be absorbed by the growth of the protocol. This ensures that all token holders share in the recovery of a protocol-level failure, rather than placing the entire burden on the victims.
I also want to address the precedent argument. You mentioned that reimbursing users introduces moral hazard. In reality, the far more dangerous precedent is teaching the market that if they deposit into a Lazy Summer vault and the curation fails, the DAO will simply postpone responsibility indefinitely. Lazy Summer is a curated vault protocol; users pay fees specifically for the selection and risk management of these vaults. When that curation fails, the curator is responsible. A DAO with a full treasury but zero user trust is a zombie protocol.
Furthermore, the attempt to shift the blame to Silo Finance is a deflection. Users did not deposit their funds into Silo; they deposited them into Lazy Summer. We are your customers, and our relationship is with this protocol. Shifting the responsibility to a third party after a failure in your curated strategy is a breach of that relationship.
Instead of hiding behind basic feasibility and current market prices to justify an indefinite delay, the DAO should commit to a formal reimbursement schedule now. This anchors the protocol’s recovery in the restoration of user trust; without it, any remaining capital will flee and no new deposits will ever follow.
Delegates, do you want to govern a protocol that abandons its users at the first sign of trouble, or one that builds a reputation for resilience and integrity?
5 Likes
Thanks for addressing this important topic with some hard numbers @jensei , while I voted for 100% reimbursement for affected users, the reality is that this is not currently possible in any way, shape, or form.
The DAO treasury simply does not have anywhere close to the amounts it would be required to reimburse affected users. And even if the only recourse was to sell SUMR reserves, given the low levels of liquidity, this would incur progressively increasing slippage/price impact that would result in users receiving only a fraction of what the SUMR is initially valued at.
This also rings true, as the fact of the matter is that neither the token nor the DAO treasury was defined (or consented to by holders) as a first‑loss capital buffer for all risks. The DAO was created to steer parameters and allocate treasury, but was not explicitly designed to underwrite every possible loss.
- Given the fact that it is currently unfeasible to reimburse users, postponement makes sense. Perhaps we can revisit this topic after 6 - 12 months to assess the state of the DAO treasury and whether feasibility has improved.
- Some explicit criteria I would personally like to see are: at what token price and liquidity level does reimbursement start to make sense? And a treasury holding (in stables) at which 10% of stable holdings could fully cover losses.
- While this is not possible for SummerFi currently, perhaps we can eventually take a similar approach to Yearn with their yETH Optimistic Recovery Plan.
I want to extend my heartfelt apologies to all affected users. I understand how stressful and disappointing this situation is. While I’m sure this incident may have eroded your trust in the protocol, I hope the Summer team learns from this incident, improves risk practices, and continues to work transparently with the community to make things right as far as is reasonably possible.
1 Like
Strongly agree with @jefflost
The issue is not “can the DAO reimburse everything today”, but whether the DAO is willing to formally acknowledge the debt and commit to a credible, time-bound recovery path.
Many of us accepted SUMR-only compensation precisely because we believed it would be part of a longer-term, structured recovery — not an indefinite postponement dependent on market luck.
Without a schedule, milestones, or binding commitment, “postponement” is indistinguishable from abandonment, and that is what truly destroys trust.
2 Likes
Thanks for taking the time to lay out the numbers and constraints so clearly — I agree that an immediate, lump-sum reimbursement at today’s price and liquidity is not feasible and would be destructive for everyone involved.
That said, I think there is an important distinction that still needs to be made.
Postponement by itself is not a solution. It only becomes acceptable if it comes with explicit commitments, objective criteria, and a defined recovery path. Otherwise, from the perspective of affected lenders, it is indistinguishable from an indefinite deferral of responsibility.
No one here is asking the DAO to liquidate itself today or to sell SUMR recklessly into thin liquidity. What many of us are asking for is:
• formal recognition that this loss stems from a failure in a curated “Lower Risk / set-and-forget” product,
• and a time-bound, programmatic mechanism that works toward restitution as conditions improve (price, liquidity, treasury health), rather than relying on a vague “we’ll revisit this later”.
On the precedent point: the real moral hazard is not compensating users after a curation failure — it is teaching the market that depositing into a curated Lazy Summer vault comes with asymmetric risk where losses can be total, while responsibility can be postponed indefinitely. That undermines the very value proposition from which SUMR derives its long-term value.
I agree that any recovery path likely needs to be gradual and non-destructive. But “not feasible today” should not mean “no obligation defined today”. Acknowledging the debt, defining triggers, and committing future flows or mechanisms is fundamentally different from forcing an immediate payout — and it’s the difference between restoring trust and slowly eroding it.
I appreciate the constructive tone of this discussion, and I hope we can converge on a framework that balances feasibility and accountability, rather than sacrificing one for the other.
6 Likes
Sixty, this ‘Reality Check’ is a masterclass in selective accounting. While I appreciate the math, the conclusion is pure BS because it relies on a false binary: either we zero out the treasury today or we do nothing for a year. You are completely ignoring the obvious middle path I already laid out. Thank you for the effort you’ve put into trying to rationalize the theft of our funds.
2 Likes
You don’t want a dump? Ok, then don’t dump it on us 
What’s so hard and unsustainable about programmatically releasing a small amount of funds over an extended amount of time in order to compensate affected users?
More often than not, solutions are extremely simple when you want them to be. As others have pointed out, the discourse seems now to be shifting over to “we’ll delay this as much as possible with the hopes that you don’t wanna stick around for years while we take you on this pointless ride, eventually getting tired of this and saving us some money”, so it’s not a surprise that, now, solutions are suddenly all too complicated and inconvenient for “everyone” (just Summer).
2 Likes
true, agreed. Hope is fading